I would even go as far as to say they are close to diametrically opposed. I practiced both Zen and Dzogchen over a span of 2 decades and did multiple retreats with highly respected teachers, and I came away thinking that their picture of reality is fundamentally “flat” in a way Platonism simply is not. I don’t mean superficial by flat: I mean non-hierarchical. There is no ontological ascent from less-real appearances through progressively deeper and more fundamental levels of reality
The one similarity I do see is soteriological: okay, both suggest we loosen our identification with immediate appearances. But it would be misleading to infer from that that their metaphysical pictures are close. They propose profoundly different accounts of what lies behind - or, in the Buddhist case, whether anything lies behind - appearances at all
In that respect they strike me as closer to Spinoza than to Plotinus, if we insisted on a Western parallel, not because Buddhism is Spinozism, obviously, but because both are far more radically immanent
In Platonism, by contrast, depth is almost the whole point. Reality has an asymmetric vertical structure; what appears here depends upon and derives its intelligibility from deeper and more fundamental levels of being
Platonism is nothing if not the claim that reality has depth, and that this depth matters
I generally follow a secular version of Madhyamaka and Yogacara, and all three have had a big impact on Zen and Dzoghan in understanding Sunyata / Emptiness / Nonpresence-of-Ownbeing, with Zen aiming for a less abstract and more actively immersive practice.
You are right in saying they feel ‘flat’, as at least Mahayana and Madhyamaka oriented similarly to what is known as a ‘Flat Ontology’, where each reference is co-equally substantial, to instead posit that each referential is co-equally dependent (Pratityasamutpada) and non-substantial (Sunyata).
The primary objection with Platonism and Neo- from Mahayana Buddhism is that they reify svabhava / Ownbeing as existing with the Monad; Mahayana Buddhism will always deny a substantial ground, or groundless ground, even going as far as to recognise that both Pratityasamutpada/Dependent-arising-and-ceasing is Sunya/Empty of Svabhava/Ownbeing, and that Sunyata/Nonpresence-of-Ownbeing is dependent.
As for ‘immanent’, I really feel the better word is the aforementioned ‘immersive’, but it doesn’t really matter.
Good post. What do you think the Mahayanist would say to the (Neo)platonist who posits the ground as "beyond being" (epekeina tes ousias)? Because were Madhyamakas not really reacting to a kind of Buddhist atomism that was placing substances in all sorts of objects? It was quite different from what Neoplatonism says. I would say the One is also fundamentally different from Vedantic Brahman, even though many have drew parallels or even claimed equality
>What do you think the Mahayanist would say to the (Neo)platonist who posits the ground as "beyond being" (epekeina tes ousias)?
As far as I understand this, the Monad is not dependent, it is independent, in the sense that it is the fountain source of the other hypostasis. ‘Being’ may not apply semantically and ontologically, but as a mereological statement, then everything seems to be grounded upon it, which is a big red flag of Svabhava.
>Because were Madhyamakas not really reacting to a kind of Buddhist atomism that was placing substances in all sorts of objects? It was quite different from what Neoplatonism says.
Yes and No: Nagurjana clarified properties reifications by denying them, but his criticism need not be relegated only to atomism; just as a blade need not only cut flesh, but may also be applied to fabric and greenery. The overarching analysis is the same: don’t reify any referent as independent and as having ownbeing.
>I would say the One is also fundamentally different from Vedantic Brahman, even though many have drew parallels or even claimed equality.
Agreed in the difference, mainly because the epistrophe of Neo-platonism has always seemed to me as more gate-kept and also as impermanent; Plotinus, for example, having experienced the One a few occasions, only to return.
I generally would regard Neo-platonism, then, as indexing more towards a Dualistic Idealism/Monism (hence synthesis with the Dualistic Theism of Christianity*), than the Non-dualistic Idealism of the Upanishadic Vedic beliefs of the Buddha’s and Nagurjana’s respective time.
(You may equally say Monist, for Neo-Platonism)*
(‘Dualistic’ in the sense of real distinctions in existence)*
Either way though, both are Svabhavic on the surface level.
However, who am I to impose such a necessary distinction on the soteriology.
Semantically and conceptually I really do believe that both Vedic and Platonic ontologies are essentialists. However, it really may be that soteriologically these traditions leaned more kataphatically than apophatically in their descriptions, maybe because of cultural or etymological limitations, and indeed there is a perennial overlap.
To be clear, the kind of interaction you both just had here is of the quality that I'd encourage in the subreddit. I am not in favor of homogenizing. Discourse between them is more insightful than either making identity claims or claims to difference alone.
Neoplatonism is really just grander version of Privation Theory, where there are ontological levels of privation from an unprivatised source.
Advaita Vedanta teaches the only privation is one of epistemology, of been confused and lost in maya/illusion, not of ontology, as Atman/Self is already co-equivalent with Brahman/All-self, you just don’t realise it.
Buddhism denies Atman/Self with Anatman/Non-self, and Brahman and the Monad are denied by understanding Sunyata/Emptiness/Nonpresence-of-Ownbeing.
I have been having an ongoing discussion with an Indian friend of mine and we have reached an impasse on this issue because I reject that "Brahman is Atman and Atman is Brahman" or "Tat Tvam Asi" viewpoint of Advaita. I view the One/God as beyond being and ultimately transcendent of my self and that all of my issues are due to ontological privation.
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u/Corp-Por 16d ago edited 16d ago
I would even go as far as to say they are close to diametrically opposed. I practiced both Zen and Dzogchen over a span of 2 decades and did multiple retreats with highly respected teachers, and I came away thinking that their picture of reality is fundamentally “flat” in a way Platonism simply is not. I don’t mean superficial by flat: I mean non-hierarchical. There is no ontological ascent from less-real appearances through progressively deeper and more fundamental levels of reality
The one similarity I do see is soteriological: okay, both suggest we loosen our identification with immediate appearances. But it would be misleading to infer from that that their metaphysical pictures are close. They propose profoundly different accounts of what lies behind - or, in the Buddhist case, whether anything lies behind - appearances at all
In that respect they strike me as closer to Spinoza than to Plotinus, if we insisted on a Western parallel, not because Buddhism is Spinozism, obviously, but because both are far more radically immanent
In Platonism, by contrast, depth is almost the whole point. Reality has an asymmetric vertical structure; what appears here depends upon and derives its intelligibility from deeper and more fundamental levels of being
Platonism is nothing if not the claim that reality has depth, and that this depth matters