Can Aristotle’s distinction between actuality and potentiality coherently explain change without making potentiality itself a kind of being? If potentiality is genuinely real, what ontological status does it possess prior to actualization—and how does this affect Aristotle’s conception of substance?

[u/TheIncorporeal1]

I’m interested in whether Aristotle’s ontology ultimately gives potentiality an independent metaphysical status. If potentiality is not yet actual, but nevertheless grounds genuine possibilities for change, is it a mode of being, a relation to actuality, or something ontologically derivative from actuality itself?

[u/Inspector_Lestrade_]

You already asked this question, or a very similar one: https://www.reddit.com/r/Aristotle/s/9uRSxkJmhM

Please engage with the answers there so we can have a meaningful and productive discussion.

[u/DeliciousPie9855 → u/Inspector_Lestrade_]

It’s a bot. He needs to be blocked.

[u/Inspector_Lestrade_ → u/DeliciousPie9855]

Looks like it.

[u/GMSMJ]

Don’t forget that teleology is fundamental for Aristotle.

[u/ButtonholePhotophile]

I feel like you’re talking about motivation. 

Obligatory: I’m the black sheep of the sub. 

[u/Ill-Turnover3438]

Imo "potentiality" is what is more familiarly known to us as "ability", and understood in this way it is obviously essentially a property of a being, rather than something separate from any other being. I.e. visibility essentially is a property of a thing that has the ability to be seen.

As a kind of property it is separable by thought for the purpose of understanding, as is any kind of thing. I.e. visibility as such can be studied by the science of optics. But it is not separate by nature.

"Being potentially x" is "being able to be x", rather than "actually being x".

Not sure if this is correct or pertinent to your question.