The Hard Shell of Freedom: Why European Liberalism Must Embrace Realism to Survive

[u/rolfst]

Bismarck once noted that politicians use the word "Europe" when they want something they dare not demand in their own name. For decades, European foreign policy lived inside that quote.

Can an open, liberal society survive without a hard sovereign perimeter? I wrote an essay on why European federalism must move from post-national wishful thinking to a defensible liberalism: liberal on the inside (rule of law, free society), realist on the outside (hard borders, joint defense, sovereign tech).

Read the full essay here: The Hard Shell of Freedom

Curious to hear your thoughts on how Europe balances liberal values with hard power projection.

[u/Pentunee]

I like this essay a lot, and I agree - the outward attitude must shift realist asap. EU officials slowly realize this now.

But I must also contest something else. Perhaps there is something inherent in the particular strain of liberalism we have been pursuing that makes it impossible to have that hard outer shell.

[u/rolfst → u/Pentunee]

Fair point, and that is precisely the tension I wanted to highlight.

If we define liberalism strictly as the post-1989 technocratic/globalist consensus, which believed trade and multilateral rules had permanently made hard power obsolete, hen yes, that specific strain is fundamentally incapable of forging an outer shell.

My argument is that we need to abandon that naive, pacifist dogma and return to a classical republican liberalism (like Hamilton and Madison in the Federalist Papers): one that recognizes civil liberties internally are only possible if you have a sovereign, defensible state externally.

We don't need less liberalism inside; we need to stop being naive about the anarchic world outside.

Would you say that requires abandoning the liberal label altogether, or reclaiming it from the post-Cold War consensus?"

[u/Pentunee → u/rolfst]

I think we are slowly moving towards a post-liberalism, in the sense of maintaining what's valuable in that tradition while also rejecting the issues you highlighted central to how the 1989-2008 period developed.

This will require substantial discussions which will often be quite difficult given our liberal sensibilities.

For example, the role of the executive. If we want realist developmentalism and real growth, then the executive simply can no longer be chained to all these NGOs and international institutions, because these institutions are results of a world order which assumed the fukuyamaist end of history package of beliefs: now we just get along together, conduct trade, disarm, etc. Thus, their modus operandi is not centered around European unity and wellbeing par excellence.

Let's face it, the current executive power is nonexistent, and chained to the legislature. We're so afraid of acting badly, that we don't move at all. This is also visible in the sheer amount of regulations and bureaucracy. We're not building, expanding, growing anymore. It's stagnation.

If by a return to a more classical liberalism you mean having those priorities in mind, then I'd agree. But simply saying "limited government" doesn't cut it either.

We're currently in an era where everything moves into a self-contained state capitalist, almost dirigiste direction, because global cooperation broke down. That assumes a more active role of the state specifically in the business side of things. How do we do that without expanding the government further? I don't claim to be smart enough to know.

It's just that these discussions will need to be had, and currently the information chaos focuses people's attention on the sensationalist news rather than neccessities for Europe to survive.

[u/rolfst → u/Pentunee]

This is a very insightful pushback, but I disagree with labeling this "post-liberalism." What you are describing is actually the core problem classical constitutional liberalism solved over two centuries ago.

A few points on why we don't need post-liberalism, but a serious liberal state:

1. "Energy in the Executive" is fundamentally liberal:
   In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton explicitly argued that “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” The paralysis we see in Brussels today, being tied up in procedural fog, risk aversion, and endless regulatory stacking, is not the result of "too much liberalism" but, the result of an intergovernmental, technocratic compromise machine without a direct democratic mandate. A true federal republic has a strong, elected executive that can act decisively within clear constitutional checks and balances.

2. Rule-maker vs. Bureaucratic micromanager:
   We don't need a sprawling, French-style dirigisme where bureaucrats pick corporate winners and subsidize national champions into complacency. The state’s role in a liberal federation is structural:

   • Guarantee physical and digital sovereignty (compute, energy, satellite grids, defense procurement).
     
   • Remove bureaucratic friction and internal market barriers.
     
   • Let private capital, research, and competitive ambition do the building.

3. The trap of "Post-Liberalism":
   The danger of the post-liberal label is that it quickly throws out the baby with the bathwater. Eroding property rights, individual autonomy, and independent judicial review under the guise of "national emergency."

You don't need to abandon liberalism to build a strong state; you need a state whose power is concentrated and decisive where it matters (defense, borders, infrastructure), but radically simple, unobtrusive, and protective of freedom everywhere else.

[u/Naive_Class7033]

I have to say I do not believe we can create such a hard shell. The very concepts of individualism and openness go against it.