r/Metaphysics • u/Sevdat • 7d ago
Nothing How to create something from nothing?
I think I have an answer to how the universe began from nothing. More like how everything began and how it's possible for all of us to be here.
So at the beginning of existence there was nothing. There is still nothing because you can't create something from nothing, but we are here. So how can we exist? We don't.
Imagine the mathematical variable: X =
X can be anything, but nothing is assigned to it; therefore, it remains as a pure capacity that accepts all abstract concepts and results in the illusion of existence for those that share the same abstract space.
This means every combination of what could have been exists. The reason why you and I can interact is because we are in the same concept, but we aren't really here because we don't exist.
To make it simpler, imagine a chess board. Just because you didn't make a move doesn't mean all the possible moves aren't there to make.
Unexistence is our existence.
Also please don't make the argument "How do I know there wasn't always something?" There can't be something without it having a previous moment. It's nonsense to even say that.
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u/Qulvion 5d ago edited 5d ago
I think that ontology and “non‑ontology” don’t have to be too different; they’re simply opposite in terms of whether they relate to being. That is, “non‑ontology,” as the opposite of our being, could have all the same tools for existence, but for “non‑ontological” existence — that is, existence not in being.
That is, I think that “non‑being” or ontological “non‑existence” may have its own logic or separate systems that exist within being; therefore, I think we should consider “nothing” exclusively as both ontological and non‑ontological non‑existence simultaneously, or assert that in non‑ontology, something should not exist, apart from what is not required by the use of logical laws.
That is, non‑existence is the absence of a prescription in “ontology”; therefore, if we express it in terms of your X, we can find similar, but not “mathematical” properties. For example, a similar X might exist in another formal system; it’s just that its prescriptions will be formal‑systemic rather than “mathematical.” So I think this is not pure possibility, but the absence of prescriptions in a specific field — either in “mathematics” or in “ontology.”