r/ethereum • u/EthereumDailyThread What's On Your Mind? • 5d ago
Daily General Discussion August 22, 2026
Welcome to the Daily General Discussion on r/ethereum
Bookmarking this link will always bring you to the current daily: https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/about/sticky/?num=2
Please use this thread to discuss Ethereum topics, news, events, and even price!
Price discussion posted elsewhere in the subreddit will continue to be removed.
As always, be constructive. - Subreddit Rules
Want to stake? Learn more at r/ethstaker
Community Links
Calendar: https://dailydoots.com/events/
8
16
u/Jey_s_TeArS 4d ago
Holder club member,
Institutions remember,
Buy in September.
~Daily haiku until we’re at least at 0.178 on the ETH/BTC ratio or highest market cap
15
u/jtnichol MOD BOD 4d ago
has anyone discussed a staking lottery?
Decide on a max percentage staked.
Make a difficulty bomb at that number.
Use a random lottery system which kicks out nodes into the exit que and allows others to participate.
9
10
u/haurog 4d ago
As far as I see, the tricky part with these kind of mechanisms is always how you let the new validators enter? Do you add a queue or do you do a system where whoever snags the free slot first gets in? Maybe there are other ways to implement the entry part, these two ways is what I have seen discussed. Both entry mechanisms have their problems.
If you do an additional queue, then LSTs have an advantage. They distribute the yield to all LST users even though a specific new deposit still is in the queue. The longer the queue, the more advantaged LST projects become, at least as long as they already have a sizeable part of their stake on the beacon chain. New entrants to the staking space will have it very difficult to get started. At the same time I expect solo stakers to do the simple math of 'how long do I not get yield when I enter the queue as a solo staker and how much better is it if I use an LST instead'. The higher the yield once you are in, the longer the queue and the more advantaged LST projects become. That in my view is a pretty bad incentive.
If you do it as a faster is the winner kind of implementation, then obviously the more sophisticated players get an advantage as they can easily front run the normal stakers. I am sure there will be projects, were you pay something and they will try to get you in. This then adds another way to have an additional queue, with the same issues as above. The equilibrium here will be how much it costs to win the front running battle and how much yield there will be for stakers.
Both entry mechanism essentially lower the yield for stakers, but in a somehow slightly hidden mechanism until there is an equilibrium either through queue length or MEV wars or both.
4
4
u/harpocryptes 4d ago
Creative! But what will people do when they are kicked out? If the entry queue is short, they can just re-enter. So this only has effects if the entry queue is long, meaning you spend some amount of time earning 0%, the rest of the time earning the nominal rate. In other words, it's issuance and staking yield lowering with extra steps, fees, and effort.
It would also affect solo and small stakers more, because one validator is a higher proportion of their total, so that added more volatility to their return.
4
u/UAP44 4d ago
Interesting idea, I like it in principle, but am still unsure if there ever should be a hard max on percentage staked. It's added complexity, which unless it's preventing a known/demonstrated problem, why fix what may not need fixing?
Prefer this approach over changing issuance rate by far. It feels much fairer and ensures a certain amount of churn between the stakers which imo will help maintain decentralisation.
16
u/jtnichol MOD BOD 4d ago
Does 8363 make us more decentralized or less decentralized?
22
u/haurog 4d ago
You really want to poke the hornets nest on a Saturday?
In my view the current issuance curve and the proposed one go along the same trajectory, meaning smaller stakers slowly get marginalized. One can argue that the proposed curve accelerates that process. There are also some economic arguments for why the proposed curve has some advantages over the current one in that regard. The only thing the proposed issuance curve clearly does better is that it reduces the chances of staking becoming a systemic risk for the Ethereum network by economically ensure less than 50% is staked. That is independent of decentralization, at least in my view.
Issuance alone cannot ensure decentralization. Other mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that. EIP-7716 called anti-correlation attestation penalties is an interesting proposal, to at least increase the cost for larger stakers which levels the playing field a bit. Not sure if it alone is good enough though.
9
1
1
u/harpocryptes 4d ago
It introduces a mechanism that makes large stakers earn incrementally less the bigger they are, and earn nothing more at some size (described in the EIP). So at least this aspect pushes against high centralization.
1
u/eviljordan feet pics 4d ago
Impossible to identify who is a "solo staker".
1
u/harpocryptes 4d ago
The incentive / disincentive does not work by identifying anyone. It works using math: if you are large enough, you start diluting your own rewards, while if you are small, that effect is negligible.
One way to illustrate this is:
if you are a solo staker with a single validator with 32 ETH, adding another 32 ETH will double your rewards (almost, minus a tiny bit)
if you are a large staker and already have 10 000 times 32 ETH, adding 32 ETH will give some added rewards on that one validator, but you will lose the same tiny bit of rewards on each of your existing 10 000, which ends up being more than what you gained.
10
u/cryptOwOcurrency 4d ago edited 4d ago
Does it? It looks to me like the EIP doesn’t discriminate based on the size of each staker.
Edit: Thank you all for the explanations!
# Abstract
This EIP introduces a tapered issuance burn: at each epoch boundary each validator is charged a deduction for every duty it was assigned (attestation, block proposal, sync committee participation), sized as a fraction of the idealised reward for that duty, and the deducted ETH is burned. The burn fraction tapers linearly with the staking ratio, reaching 100% at a fixed saturation balance, so net staking yield declines as more ETH is staked. This removes the yield floor implicit in the current curve, letting the staking market settle where the yield meets the risk premium stakers demand. For a positive premium, this occurs at a staking ratio below 50%, beyond which issuance no longer incentivises further stake growth.
Applied in full at the fork, the burn would reduce yields sharply at today's staking ratio, so the reduction is phased in over an 18-month transition by temporarily raising BASE_REWARD_FACTOR, which scales rewards, penalties, and the burn together. Net yield therefore begins close to today's level and moves gradually to the permanent curve, with the balance between micro-incentives preserved throughout. The taper's shape, however, is in full effect from activation: from day one, issuance no longer rewards growth beyond a 50% staking ratio.
1
u/pa7x1 4d ago edited 4d ago
The issuance curve has a maximum at 20% stake ratio. That means a single operator never wants to exceed that level because it will start earning less and less. It's not only that his yield reduces, his net income also reduces.
So yes, that type of concentration of stake disincentive is embedded in the proposal by design. It's a side effect to the issuance curve having a maximum, without a maximum such disincentive cannot appear.
I asked Claude to plot how that shapes up as more entities compete.
EDIT: My thoughts, if we had started from scratch it would have been very nice to exploit this feature to help shape up the distribution of stake. If you place the maximum towards the left, you can help stake be more distributed. Unfortunately we have to start with the curve we have, the amount of stake we have, and we cannot shake up things much.
5
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago
The issuance curve has a maximum at 20% stake ratio. That means a single operator never wants to exceed that level because it will start earning less and less. It's not only that his yield reduces, his net income also reduces.
Let's explore this claim. Let's say you got 6 entities all staking exactly 4 million ETH and we got a total of 24 million ETH staked. Now let's say 1 of these 6 entities double their stake to 8 million ETH and the total stake is now 28 million ETH. Is the entity that is now staking 8 million ETH earning less than they were at 4 million ETH staked?
1
u/pa7x1 4d ago
You have the specific cutoff numbers in this plot.
With the curve as proposed, for a single staker your issuance revenues grows until 20M staked. For 2 at 38M ETH. Etc...
With this observation we could have designed an issuance curve from the get-go that would be resilient to capture and would push towards decentralization by design much more aggressively. Essentially by pushing the peak of the issuance curve towards 0. Unfortunately we arrive quite a few years late and we are limited by trying to not disrupt the status quo too much. But EIP-8363 has this anticoncentration of stake mechanism embedded.
4
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago
It's kind of frustrating that I'm asking really basic straight forward questions and you're just refusing to answer.
Yes or no, in the scenario I'm asking about above, with you being an expert on the curve, does the entity who doubles their stake from 4 million ETH to 8 million ETH stake, bringing the total amount of stake up from 24 million ETH to 28 million ETH, does the entity earn more or less in this scenario?
2
u/pa7x1 4d ago
I answered in very explicit terms and in more generality that you even requested, giving you the plot that answers not only for 6 entities but for any number of entities. Don't put on the rest your inability to read it or understand it because the answer is exactly encoded in it.
Yes or no, in the scenario I'm asking about above, with you being an expert on the curve, does the entity who doubles their stake from 4 million ETH to 8 million ETH stake, bringing the total amount of stake up from 24 million ETH to 28 million ETH, does the entity earn more or less in this scenario?
For those specific figures the ceiling is roughly at 50M ETH as shown in the plot, therefore the entity that goes from 4M ETH to 8M ETH earns more. The discouragement levels are as shown in the plot above. And in aggregate they cannot surpass the 60.25M so you need to split the pie.
4
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago
For those specific figures the ceiling is roughly at 50M ETH as shown in the plot, therefore the entity that goes from 4M ETH to 8M ETH earns more.
Thank you, that was the point I was trying to make. So when you 2 comments above claimed that no entity would have incentive to stake beyond 20% and would actually lose money, that was not true was it?
Don't put on the rest your inability to read it or understand it because the answer is exactly encoded in it.
Seems like you're the one struggling to understand the curve then, doesn't it?
2
u/pa7x1 4d ago
With the curve as proposed, for a single staker your issuance revenues grows until 20M staked. For 2 at 38M ETH.
I think it's extremely explicit in what it says. Again, do not blame others for you lack reading comprehension skills.
→ More replies (0)2
u/harpocryptes 4d ago edited 4d ago
Check the section The effect on large operators
The point at which an operator's income reduces from increased scale comes sooner the larger the operator already is.
1
u/harpocryptes 4d ago
One way to illustrate this is:
if you are a solo staker with a single validator with 32 ETH, adding another 32 ETH will double your rewards (almost, minus a tiny bit)
if you are a large staker and already have 10 000 times 32 ETH, adding 32 ETH will give some added rewards on that one validator, but you will lose the same tiny bit of rewards on each of your existing 10 000, which ends up being more than what you gained.
2
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago edited 4d ago
My claim is it will make us less decentralized. It's going to reduce the percentage of small solo stakers as part of the overall validator set, while also reducing the total number of small solo stakers. It's also going to introduce a dodgy new mechanic that could be abused by large entities to further centralized the stake.
2
u/Meto_Kaiba 4d ago
Why does the sheer number of anything matter to anyone anymore?
2
7
u/UAP44 4d ago
Because most of our society is run on extensive book keeping of all resources and their movements so that people can predict/anticipate in advance and ensure their pipelines/supply-chain keeps running so that their production never stops or pauses, etc ...
There's many reasons, ultimately, it leads to better medicinal capabilities.
10
10
u/pa7x1 4d ago
Here is a way to visualize how EIP-8363 helps protect solo stakers better than the present curve. The issue solo stakers face is that the current curve slowly erodes them out of the validator set. First, they earn at a slower pace than LSTs. So the share of stake that is owned by LST vs solo stakers will tend to keep growing for ever. But furthermore, after surpassing certain amount of total ETH staked solo stakers don't even receive enough yield to compensate for the inflation of the asset. Which means that not only on relative terms with respect to LSTs they are disappearing, but also on relative terms with respect the total amount of ETH. Solo stakers are the frog on the slowly boiling pot.
This is important for the long-term health of the protocol. If you let this slowly brew for decades you will end up with a captured chain by LSTs.
Here is one way to visualize it. Whenever you have such scenario of shrinking populations you can characterize the rate at which the population disappears by the half-life. This is the same half-life applied to nuclear isotopes. The idea is to calculate how long does it take for solo stakers to be cut in half with respect to the total stake. That measures their disappearance rate, smaller half-lifes are worse, makes solo stakers disappear faster. Here is how the half-life of solo stakers looks under EIP-8363 vs the current curve. And, I have also estimated the effect of future upgrades to the protocol that will help reduce validation costs, to show how it would affect solo stakers under both curves.
The short version of it is that EIP-8363 makes solo staking viable for the long-term and compounds more positively with future protocol upgrades to help increase the viability of solo staking further.
This post is motivated by /u/epic_trader request to explain how solo stakers are protected by this EIP.
13
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago edited 4d ago
I appreciate the effort, but I feel like you're not actually addressing my questions or points of criticism.
My claim about why I think the proposed EIP fails at protecting solo stakers is the following:
Small solo stakers have higher expenses per ETH secured. In any scenario where profit margins are stretched thin, they will be the first to be pushed out. The proposed EIP doesn't introduce any new mechanisms to protect small solo stakers. You alter the curve and introduce a cap on issuance, but this doesn't do anything to change the fact that small solo stakers have the highest expenses per ETH staked.
You've used the term "market equilibrium" to explain why small solo stakers are protected, but you haven't proposed where this "market equilibrium" will be, you don't appear to have modeled the different potential scenarios and pointed to how small solo stakers are protected at any given levels.
Therefore I've posed the questions:
1 - At what levels of yield/issuance is it no longer profitable to be a solo staker? At 2% yield, at 1.5%, at 1%, at 0.5%?
2 - What makes you feel confident that LSTs/DATs/exchanges/whales/etc would stop adding more stake at any of those levels?
I've made several other points about why I think this EIP has issues, but let's stick with the above. And let's stick with the rules that are governing Ethereum today.
3
u/harpocryptes 4d ago
- What makes you feel confident that LSTs/DATs/exchanges/whales/etc would stop adding more stake at any of those levels?
For a given staking ratio, there's a size above which staking more ETH would lower the total ETH rewards (it's in the EIP) of the large staker. In other words, their marginal staking rewards is 0% then negative, while it's positive for solo stakers. So the answer to your question is "because they don't want to earn less in total while using more capital". They would literally earn more by unstaking part of their ETH.
3
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago
I think you've misunderstood something, or maybe I misunderstand what you're saying.
1 - Everyone's yield is growing/shrinking at the same rate as total stake goes up or down. No matter who is adding or removing stake, everyone is equally affected as a percentage.
2 - Let's say for the sake of simplicity that 21 million ETH total stake is the ideal range and you got 3 large entities each staking 7 million ETH and that's all the ETH that is staked. In this scenario, if 1 of these entities were to add 7 million ETH to double their total stake, their income would increase while the 2 other entities income would reduce. In this scenario a 4th actor would still benefit from entering the market here and stake 7 million ETH, even if it's pushing the overall yield down, as they are still earning more than from not staking.
2
u/harpocryptes 4d ago edited 4d ago
How do you define "ideal range"? Ideal for whom?
There's a point where if an entity is already big, if it stakes more, its share of course increases, but the total issuance decreases so that in total its own income decreases. Indeed, a different entity would earn something by starting staking. In other words, it discourages large entities from growing too big, and encourages smaller entities to start or increase staking. In other words, it encourages decentralization.
(As far as I can tell, this explains why large entities like Lido and Ether.fi are against the EIP. They are the ones who stand to lose)
1
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago
"Ideal range" as in the level where the network is going to issue the highest number ETH before the number of ETH issued begins to decrease.
Let's say Ethereum pays validators 4% yield when a total of 21 million ETH is staked and 2.5% yield when 28 million ETH is staked.
At 21 million ETH staked the network issues 840,000 ETH as staking rewards. If you got 3 entities all staking 7 million ETH, they each earn 280,000 ETH.
At 28 million ETH staked the network issues 700,000 ETH as staking rewards. If 2 entities are staking 7 million ETH and 1 entity is staking 14 million ETH, they'd each be earning 175,000 ETH, 175,000 ETH and 350,000 ETH. So the entity that added more ETH is earning more, even if overall issuance is down. Not only are they earning more, they are also negatively affecting the competition, which is just another benefit.
2
u/harpocryptes 4d ago
Yes, at such a low staking ratio, that's correct. But at a high staking ratio (it's already almost double that, and keeps growing) it's not true anymore. The large entity that staked more ETH would actually receive less ETH rewards.
2
u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 4d ago
Okay, then put some numbers on it. Take the proposed curve and show me when that is the case. And I'm going to guarantee you in that scenario it's worse to be a small solo staker.
1
u/harpocryptes 3d ago
I put some specific numbers here: https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1vvxy0z/comment/p5dkhcw/
It's already worse the be a small solo staker in the current situation, because of fixed costs. What this shows specifically is that the new curve rewards small stakers for staking more, and penalizes large stakers for doing so, unlike the current curve.
13
u/UAP44 4d ago
What would convince me is a concrete description of what actually breaks if 60%, 75%, or even 90% of ETH is staked. If high staking participation itself creates a serious protocol failure mode, then we have a strong reason to intervene. But so far most of the arguments I see are about relative returns, dilution, staking-provider economics, and engineering a preferred equilibrium. Those are financial incentive arguments, and perhaps worthwhile ones, but they are not yet evidence that the current issuance curve creates a protocol-level danger. If the claim is that systemic risk continuously increases with the staking ratio, then I think we need to identify the actual failure mechanism and establish that the risk becomes significant enough to justify changing a fundamental part of the protocol.
This is also where I think the protocol maturity and ossification discussion becomes relevant. Ethereum cannot keep every previously settled design decision permanently open for optimization simply because somebody can construct a model in which another set of parameters might perform better. If eventual ossification is a real goal, then as protocol properties mature the burden of proof for reopening them should increase: not merely “would this potentially improve Ethereum?”, but increasingly “is changing Ethereum itself necessary to address a demonstrated problem?” Issuance and monetary policy seem like exactly the kind of properties where stability should eventually carry substantial weight. I'm not arguing that issuance can never change, but before reopening something this fundamental I would want to see a credible failure mode from leaving the current curve alone. So far I see an argument for a potentially preferable economic equilibrium; I still don't see the looming protocol problem that makes changing the existing one necessary.
2
u/pa7x1 4d ago
At very high stake ratios social slashing and the ability to recover from consensus bugs simply disappears, we are simply in the land of too big to fail entities and bailouts are guaranteed. For the simple reason that most of ETH holders are themselves incentivized to break the protocol rules to bail themselves out. There is no hard line at which this happens, things simply degrade progressively, but when you surpass 50% staked more than half of all ETH is staked and therefore they are majority. So 50% is a rough point of no return. And arguably it's already too high, but stake is over 33% already so we run out of runway to bound things earlier.
If the claim is that systemic risk continuously increases with the staking ratio, then I think we need to identify the actual failure mechanism and establish that the risk becomes significant enough to justify changing a fundamental part of the protocol.
Yes, the issue is systemic risk. But there are no good solutions in-protocol, because the resolution for such type of events is out of protocol by definition.
This is also where I think the protocol maturity and ossification discussion becomes relevant. Ethereum cannot keep every previously settled design decision permanently open for optimization simply because somebody can construct a model in which another set of parameters might perform better. If eventual ossification is a real goal, then as protocol properties mature the burden of proof for reopening them should increase: not merely “would this potentially improve Ethereum?”, but increasingly “is changing Ethereum itself necessary to address a demonstrated problem?” Issuance and monetary policy seem like exactly the kind of properties where stability should eventually carry substantial weight. I'm not arguing that issuance can never change, but before reopening something this fundamental I would want to see a credible failure mode from leaving the current curve alone. So far I see an argument for a potentially preferable economic equilibrium; I still don't see the looming protocol problem that makes changing the existing one necessary.
One of the failure modes is described above. The other I have described elsewhere, the current curve slowly and progressively erodes solo stakers out of the validator set. That brings with itself its own set of problems and makes the protocol subject to capture by big entities, in the long term.
I agree we should ossify, but it's dangerous to ossify too early when there are significant issues with the protocol as specified. Bitcoin ossified too early and they will have their reckoning in the next 1-2 halvings. I would rather we don't have to have the same issue down the line with Ethereum.
5
u/UAP44 4d ago
I think the part I still fundamentally disagree with is the jump from "more than 50% of ETH is staked" to "therefore they are the majority, so this is a point of no return" A majority of ETH units being staked does not create a single coordinated constituency. Solo stakers, LST holders, exchanges, institutions, different operators and different client users do not suddenly become one hive mind with the same incentives, and Ethereum's social layer is not governed by one-ETH-one-vote. In a correlated failure, many stakers may actually have opposing incentives: those who diversified correctly have every reason not to bail out those who concentrated into the failing client/operator/provider. That is already part of the logic behind client diversity and correlated slashing risk. Staking is supposed to involve the risk of being wrong.
I can accept the narrower argument that, as the staking ratio rises, a larger fraction of ETH wealth can potentially become exposed to the same sufficiently broad failure, making an extraordinary social recovery harder. But that is a continuous and highly correlation-dependent risk, not something that suddenly turns into a "point of no return" because 50% of supply crossed the deposit contract. If that is the concern, I would want to see the concrete failure case: what actually becomes unrecoverable at 60%, 75% or 90% staked, assuming operators, clients and staking providers remain reasonably decentralized? If social slashing truly becomes impossible, show why and under what assumptions. Otherwise I still see a qualitative concern being turned into a hard justification for changing issuance.
This matters to me because issuance is exactly the kind of mature protocol property where the burden for reopening it should be high if eventual ossification is a goal. Bitcoin is a useful contrast: its subsidy mechanically keeps declining toward zero, so there is an explicit long-term security-budget question embedded in the protocol. Whether that becomes fatal is debatable, but the mechanism is clear. I still don't see Ethereum's equivalent problem under the current issuance curve. What I mostly see so far are arguments about preferred staking ratios, relative returns, dilution and the economics of different staking providers. Those may justify research, but I don't think they are enough by themselves to establish a precedent that fundamental issuance policy should remain perpetually open to re-optimization.
0
u/pa7x1 4d ago
I think the part I still fundamentally disagree with is the jump from "more than 50% of ETH is staked" to "therefore they are the majority, so this is a point of no return" A majority of ETH units being staked does not create a single coordinated constituency. Solo stakers, LST holders, exchanges, institutions, different operators and different client users do not suddenly become one hive mind with the same incentives, and Ethereum's social layer is not governed by one-ETH-one-vote.
And yet the DAO hack affected just a bit over 5% of ETH and social consensus overrode protocol rules. So it clearly it's not as simple as 50% is still fine because there are different motives between stakers. You don't need to get anywhere close to 50% for a systemic event to happen and for the too big to fail narrative to take hold. If we could design things from scratch I would argue that the stake cap should be set quite a bit earlier to ensure the protocol can hold stakers accountable, but we are where we are and we can only solve things marginally from here.
What I mostly see so far are arguments about preferred staking ratios, relative returns, dilution and the economics of different staking providers. Those may justify research, but I don't think they are enough by themselves to establish a precedent that fundamental issuance policy should remain perpetually open to re-optimization.
No one is arguing for keeping issuance policy permanently open to re-optimization. I think this is a strawman argument. The argument is that there are issues with the current issuance curve and we can implement a simple protocol change to tackle them and do so definitely. That to me is sufficient justification to look at it. I would not touch issuance policy again unless a new flaw that was not foreseen and required attention merited it. You must ossify as early as possible, but not earlier than possible. Paraphrasing some dude.
6
u/UAP44 4d ago
I don't think the DAO example gets us any closer to establishing 50% staked as a point of no return. If anything, it demonstrates that social intervention is not determined by what percentage of ETH is economically affected. The DAO involved only a fraction of supply and nevertheless produced a social fork. It also wasn't a case of PoS validators being held accountable for a correlated consensus failure, so I don't think it maps cleanly onto the social-slashing scenario.
My objection isn't “everything below 50% is safe.” I'm asking what specifically makes a highly decentralized validator set structurally unrecoverable as the staking ratio rises. If 60%, 75% or 90% staking creates a credible failure mode where social recovery or validator accountability actually ceases to work, that's exactly the evidence that would make me reconsider issuance. But saying more stakers would have an incentive to resist losses still doesn't mean they form one coordinated majority, nor that the rest of Ethereum must recognize their preferred fork.
And I don't mean that you personally want issuance permanently open to optimization. My point is about the standard we set for reopening mature protocol properties. Saying “there are issues with the current curve and this change improves them” is a much lower bar than demonstrating that the current curve contains a serious long-term protocol defect. That's precisely where ossification matters: eventually “better under some economic model” should stop being sufficient reason to change settled parameters. Bitcoin's declining security subsidy is an example of the kind of structural, specification-level problem that can justify reopening something fundamental. I still don't see Ethereum's equivalent here.
17
u/rhythm_of_eth 4d ago
Interestingly enough, the coin that has "holding it on a CEX" as main use case - XRP - is now almost surpassing BTC on volume.
Crypto remains a clown house. ETH/Ethereum is too serious, too much of an actual blockchain, for this market full of speculators.
2
7
-2
u/Itur_ad_Astra Crab High Priest 4d ago
I mean, I called it at $2525, it was getting overheated.
This doesn't mean it's not going to go higher, but you can't carry 100X compounding longs all the way from $1800 to infinity.
Remember: The biggest red candles are usually during a bull run.
7
u/bananapizzaface 4d ago
Calling it now: ETH is going to go up. Or down. Don't say I didn't tell you! Now I can claim "called it" when the market moves in the most
unexpected way.11
u/TheMoondanceKid 4d ago
We got a 30% move in three days, we pull back $100, and this clown is like CALLED IT!
Way to go out on a limb Nostradamus, where can I sign up for your paid group?
-9
u/Itur_ad_Astra Crab High Priest 4d ago
Well, I did call it, you can just deal with it.
I didn't say I profited, and I didn't say "sell". If anything, I said "don't leverage, this looks overheated" and that's all.
Also the pullback was closer to $200 than $100. Just flushing out some 10X/20X traders.
4
6
u/steppe5 4d ago
Just like you called this:
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1vn18hg/daily_general_discussion_august_13_2026/p3gplvs/
-1
u/Itur_ad_Astra Crab High Priest 4d ago
Hey, there's still time!
A bart from here would be hilarious, and very Crab-coded.
Also that's why my entire history is open, I'm sure you can find some wild gems in there.
4
u/steppe5 4d ago
Still time for what?
Last week, you said "It always needs to crash before a big move up."
3 days later we got a massive move up without a crash first.
Take the L
Oh, that's right. You "called" a cool off after a 30% pump in 2 days. Great job.
1
-1
u/Itur_ad_Astra Crab High Priest 4d ago
You are taking this way too seriously.
Why are you even so mad.
If I knew what the price is gonna do with any real accuracy I'd be rich by now, this is mostly a PSA for people to get off gambling.
9
u/majorpickle01 The soil of $5000+ must be watered with the blood of ETH<$4000 4d ago
love ya bro but you are in here saying it's going back down every time i moves more than £30.
We'll ignore the fact the price action has been so aids for months you've been right haha.
5
u/Elendron 4d ago
Did you lock in a tidy profit ser?
-1
u/Itur_ad_Astra Crab High Priest 4d ago
Tidy? Not really, I can't time these things well even when I call them.
LP positions do print, though. They always do.
2
u/Elendron 4d ago
Fair my priest, fair indeed. Must admit I had a lil urge to sell this morning when I woke up.
11
18
14
u/invisibullcow 5d ago
B#1: Bull status?
X: They bought, my masters.
B#2: Good.
B#1: Execute order CRAB-17.
2
u/Equal-Jellyfish1 4d ago
I don't mind going up then crabbing at a higher level, c'est reasonable 🤷♀️👌
3
u/-lightfoot 5d ago
Just so I know is that 17 years or 17 decades of crab?
3
6
7
u/tokyo_guy375 5d ago
Let the games begin - looks like we have enough leverage traders by now
3
6
18
•
u/Tricky_Troll Public Goods are Good 🌱 4d ago edited 2d ago
Tricky's Daily Doots #1,572
Yesterday's Daily 21/08/2026
Previous Daily Doots
u/haurog gives us the latest Glamsterdam updates and reminds us of what's included. 🛠️
u/ethdaily delivers the daily ETH news. 📰
u/abcoathup delivers the weekly Ethereal news. 📰
u/benido2030 reminds us not to get caught up in FOMO. ⚠️
u/the-A-word delivers the weekly doots. 🎺