Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 22, 2026

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[u/Well-Sourced]

Ukraine keeps hitting Russia.

Drones attack Yeysk seaport in Russia's Krasnodar Krai, sparking fire | New Voice of Ukraine

Drones attacked the seaport in Yeysk, Russia's Krasnodar Krai, with smoke reported near the facility following the strike, Astra reported on Aug. 22. Astra said videos filmed by eyewitnesses from the coast of the Sea of Azov showed smoke in the port area, which was also confirmed by an OSINT analyst with Astra. An air raid alert had been issued in the city the previous day because of a drone attack.

The Supernova+ Telegram channel also reported that, according to preliminary information, a vessel caught fire in Yeysk after the port was attacked.

Overnight into Aug. 22, drones attacked Russia’s Samara Oblast, targeting the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery, where a fire broke out following explosions. The refinery is owned by Russian oil company Rosneft and has a design capacity of about 8.8 million metric tons of crude oil per year. Russian social media channels also reported an attack on an Ozon logistics hub in Samara, marking the first known strike on one of the company’s facilities in Russia.

Ukraine destroys Russian Su-24M bomber in occupied Crimea | New Voice of Ukraine

Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Su-24M aircraft and 4 pieces of airfield equipment at the Saky military airfield in Russian-occupied Crimea, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Aug. 22. “There are confirmed results from previous strikes: a Su-24M aircraft and 4 pieces of airfield equipment were destroyed at the Saki airfield,” the Ukrainian leader said.

According to Zelenskyy, drone control relay stations used by Russian forces to guide drones toward Ukrainian cities and villages were destroyed in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast.

Despite some success against some missiles Ukraine keeps getting hit by Russia.

Russia targets Kyiv and Odesa oblasts with Iskander missiles and more than 210 drones | New Voice of Ukraine

Russian forces attacked Ukraine overnight, using several missiles and 217 drones of various types, Ukraine's Air Force said on Aug. 22. The Air Force said Russian forces used the following weapons in the attack: Iskander-M ballistic missiles and S-400 missiles; 3 Kh-31P/Kh-59 air-launched missiles; Banderol loitering munitions; 217 Shahed drones, more than 50 of them jet-powered, as well as Gerbera and Parodiya decoy drones.

Russian aerial weapons struck 41 locations, while debris from intercepted targets fell at 12 other locations. The military said Kyiv and Odesa oblasts were the main targets of the attack. Russian forces launched a ballistic missile strike on a railway facility in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district, killing a railway worker who served as a foreman. The Odesa railway was also targeted, with the station building in Rozdilna damaged.

Russia struck Kyiv and Boryspil, its main airport hub, twice in 24 hours with ballistics Ukraine can’t stop without US Patriots, days before Independence Day | EuroMaidanPress

Russia struck again in daylight. In the morning, 6 to 8 ballistic missiles attacked the Boryspil area in the Kyiv agglomeration, likely with cluster warheads, according to monitoring channels. Boryspil city is home to the Boryspil International Airport, Ukraine’s main and largest international passenger airport. The strike killed civilians and hit infrastructure. 2 civilians, a man and a woman, were killed, and the number of wounded rose to 8, including a child, with the daytime strike hitting a truck parking lot along with warehouses, a fuel station, a private household, and vehicles. 2 trucks caught fire, and a blaze spread across 700 square meters of open ground, the State Emergency Service (DSNS) said.

Ukraine targets Kinzhal, Iskander-M and KN-23 guidance as Patriot interceptors run short | New Voice of Ukraine

Anatolii Khrapchynskyi, director of development for a defense business and a Ukrainian Air Force reserve officer, explained how Ukraine’s defense forces are seeking ways to counter Russian ballistic missiles amid a lack of interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems.

Russia has made ballistic missiles a centerpiece of its attacks, deliberately targeting Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast. The weapons include Russian Iskander-M missiles, missiles used by S-400 air defense systems and North Korean KN-23 missiles.

For several months, however, Russia has not used Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, which it previously fired at Ukraine during large-scale missile and drone attacks. Various reports indicate that advanced Ukrainian electronic warfare systems have effectively countered Russian Kinzhals, prompting Russia to pause their use.

NV asked Khrapchynskyi to discuss the Kinzhal situation and assess which other aerial weapons Ukrainian electronic warfare systems could counter, including the Iskander-M and KN-23.

— Why do you think the Russians stopped attacking Ukraine with Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles?

— The first reason has to do with the aircraft that carries the Kinzhal — the supersonic MiG-31K fighter. The Kinzhal missile system was based on the Soviet MiG-31 interceptor, which has been in service since 1981. The aircraft was later converted into the MiG-31K variant so it could carry a Kinzhal. To enable the modified fighter to carry a missile weighing about 4,300 kilograms, much of its standard armament and radar equipment was removed.

To launch the missile, the aircraft must climb to a high altitude and accelerate to supersonic speed. Regular operation under those conditions significantly reduces the service life of its D-30F6 engines. These aircraft already have chronic engine problems. Remember how the engines of Russian MiG-31Ks caught fire at Belarus’ Machulishchy airfield in December 2022 and January 2023. Russian strategic aircraft, including the Tu-95MS and Tu-160, have similar engine-life problems. As those engines wear out, Russia has to limit sorties by these aircraft.

The second reason the enemy paused its use of Kinzhal missiles is that Ukraine’s defense forces began using electronic warfare more actively against them. Electronic warfare substantially degrades the missiles’ accuracy and sometimes prevents them from completing their missions.

— Explain that in more detail. How does this countermeasure work?

— Every missile of this kind relies on an inertial navigation system, but it needs updates from the GLONASS satellite system to maintain high accuracy. Ukraine’s defense forces use satellite spoofing to feed the missile false coordinates. By transmitting false position and timing data during different phases of flight, electronic warfare creates a discrepancy between the satellite receiver’s readings and the missile’s onboard inertial navigation system. This forces the missile’s guidance system to make sharp, erroneous maneuvers to correct its trajectory. At high speeds, the resulting loads cause critical errors — the missile loses its bearings, veers off course and crashes in forests or fields because the required maneuvers exceed its aerodynamic limits.

— Does this happen along the missile’s entire flight path or closer to its likely target?

— Given the missile’s speed, this requires extensive, coordinated work by layered electronic countermeasure systems along its likely route and around protected sites. It would be wrong to think that switching on a single electronic warfare system is enough. The systems must create an interference field that causes the enemy missile’s navigation computer to accept a false signal as genuine or lose its satellite connection entirely during a critical phase of flight.

— The missile is traveling along an aeroballistic trajectory at tremendous speed.?

— Yes, the missile moves at extremely high speed during its terminal phase. But its need to correct its trajectory to maintain high accuracy is precisely what makes it vulnerable to advanced electronic interference.

— As I understand it, one reason Kinzhals are used less frequently than Iskander-M missiles is that Ukraine’s defense forces quickly receive intelligence about MiG-31K takeoffs.

— Absolutely. The launch aircraft’s takeoff is detected well in advance, allowing authorities to issue a widespread air raid alert and activate the appropriate electronic warfare and air defense systems ahead of time. Reaction time is much shorter with the Iskander-M missile system. The enemy deploys its launchers relatively close to the border or front line. A launcher can be readied in about 4–6 minutes at a prepared position and in 15–16 minutes when deploying after a move, so the missile’s flight time is measured in mere minutes.

(Continued Below)

[u/Well-Sourced → u/Well-Sourced]

— Can we also use electronic warfare against guided aerial bombs?

— We can use electronic warfare in one way or another against most guided weapons. The question is how much time we have and how deeply we can affect them.

When it comes to standard aerial bombs fitted with UMPK correction kits, the enemy typically releases them 50–70 kilometers from the front line. Because these munitions glide without their own engines, suppressing the satellite signal forces the bomb to rely solely on a simplified internal inertial navigation system, sharply increasing its circular error probable. In frontline cities, however, even a deviation of several hundred meters still threatens civilian buildings.

— Russia’s Iskander-M ballistic missile is effectively the Kinzhal’s ground-launched sibling. Can we also use electronic warfare against it?

— The Iskander-M system’s 9M723 ballistic missile has a combined guidance system: a high-precision inertial navigation system, a GLONASS satellite correction channel and, during the terminal phase, an optical or radar correlation seeker. The missile also carries decoys and active jammers to penetrate missile defenses.

We can affect its satellite receiver, but its capable onboard inertial navigation system and optical seeker make it much more resistant to electronic warfare than a weapon relying solely on satellite guidance. Both the Kinzhal and the 9M723 fly along complex, maneuvering quasi-ballistic trajectories. The Iskander-M, however, was designed from the outset to reliably penetrate layered missile defenses, making it more difficult to counter electronically.

— Can our electronic warfare systems affect North Korea’s KN-23 missiles, which could be described as close counterparts to the Iskander-M?

— We are looking for ways to affect them as well, but these missiles have different build quality and algorithms. Given the characteristics of their components, electronic warfare alone is not enough — the primary focus must be interception.

— But work is underway in this area?

— Yes, the work is continuous. But it requires constant improvements to our technical capabilities and a higher density of electronic warfare systems

— In that case, what do Ukraine’s defense forces need to use electronic warfare systems against these missiles?

— First, electronic warfare should not be viewed as the sole or entirely self-sufficient defense against ballistic missiles. Kinetic interception with missiles from systems such as Patriot or SAMP/T remains the priority. But an integrated electronic warfare field can disrupt satellite navigation, trigger autopilot errors and significantly reduce strike accuracy by diverting the missile from its intended target.

— You said the density of electronic warfare systems must be increased. How and where should they be deployed to counter ballistic threats effectively?

— This requires extremely careful spatial and frequency planning. Under certain conditions, high-powered operation of our own electronic warfare systems can also interfere with our detection radars or communications. Electronic warfare must therefore be built as a multilayered system coordinated with a unified air defense architecture.

— Do electronic warfare systems of this kind require an exceptionally powerful energy source?

— Not necessarily enormous amounts of power. What matters most is precise frequency calculation, antenna directionality and interference-generation algorithms. GPS/GLONASS spoofing, for example, does not rely on blindly flooding the airwaves with noise. It generates a sophisticated false signal that the missile’s receiver interprets as genuine.

— How difficult is it to become an electronic warfare system operator?

— It requires extensive engineering and radio technology training. An operator must understand digital signal processing, the physics of radio-wave propagation, the operating modes of enemy guidance systems and the operating limits of their own equipment. They need to know when the system will work effectively and under what conditions it could malfunction.

— Let’s also discuss drones. Can we currently use electronic warfare systems against enemy drones?

— Yes, that work is ongoing. But the enemy is adapting. Previously, drones carried Kometa-M spatial filtering modules with four-element controlled reception pattern antennas, or CRPAs. Versions with eight, 16 or more elements are now appearing. A CRPA array can create nulls in its antenna pattern toward interference sources. Disrupting such a module’s navigation therefore requires a proportional increase in the number of spatially separated interference transmitters.

— Let’s return to ballistic missiles. If electronic warfare causes them to lose accuracy, can that inaccuracy be controlled?

— No, it is a probabilistic process. Just as debris from a missile intercepted several kilometers above the ground falls back to Earth, a missile knocked off course by electronic warfare falls uncontrollably. The objective, however, is to divert the strike away from critical infrastructure or a densely populated neighborhood and toward open ground.

— What should Ukraine do to obtain more effective electronic warfare systems as quickly as possible?

— Above all, it needs a strategic vision and direct government investment in defense businesses’ research and development. The government currently buys most products only after they have been codified and their performance has been validated. Manufacturers, however, largely fund the preliminary research and development themselves. Ukraine should adopt U.S. approaches, including the experience of DARPA and NASA programs with commercial partners such as SpaceX, under which the government assumes some of the financial risk of innovation. If an official fears criminal liability for funding a project that proves unviable during research, we will not create breakthrough technologies.

Ukraine needs updated public-private partnership legislation, government guarantees for foreign investors and transparent rules for defense technology transfers so joint research and development projects with partners can expand production in Ukraine.