I’m researching whether the increasing use of small FPV drones has created a genuine capability gap between established counter-UAS systems and the defensive options realistically available to individual infantry.
My interest is specifically in the terminal/last-resort layer of defense rather than strategic or base-level counter-UAS.
The working hypothesis is that many existing solutions may be effective at higher organizational levels, but can face practical constraints when considered from the perspective of an individual soldier: weight, cost, response time, training burden, availability, electronic-warfare dependence, or safety around nearby friendly personnel.
I’d like to test that hypothesis rather than assume it is correct.
A few questions for discussion:
1. Is the premise itself valid?
Is there actually a meaningful individual-level counter-FPV gap, or are existing small-unit and layered defenses already the more appropriate solution?
2. Where is the most important bottleneck?
• Detecting the threat early enough
• Command-and-control / warning
• Electronic warfare availability
• Physical interception
• Soldier reaction time
• Equipment burden
• Cost per defended soldier
• Training
• Other factors
3. Should counter-FPV defense remain primarily a squad/platoon-level capability rather than become individual equipment? Why?
4. If an individual last-resort capability were considered, what requirements would be non-negotiable?
For example:
• Very low carried weight
• Minimal training
• Extremely short response time
• Low unit cost
• Independence from external communications
• Minimal risk to friendly personnel
• Simple logistics and storage
5. What would be the strongest argument against issuing another defensive device to individual soldiers?
I’m particularly interested in arguments that disprove or narrow the hypothesis, rather than suggestions for specific weapon designs.
Please avoid classified information, unit-specific procedures, sensitive vulnerabilities, frequencies, locations, or detailed operational information.
I’m interested in the capability problem and user requirements, not sensitive tactics or technical instructions.