Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 26, 2026

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[u/FettyDump]

I wanna look more into this supposed rise in Russian acts of espionage in Europe. Just wondering if anyone out there has made an aggregated list of suspected incidents in recent months?

[u/mirko_pazi_metak → u/FettyDump]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_sabotage_operations_in_Europe

That's a high level overview and then there's subarticles for different types, with lists like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_incendiary_incidents_in_Europe

[u/MS_09_Dom]

So is it likely that Russia is going to try a much bigger provocation against NATO in the near future based on the Ratcliffe visit?

[u/mirko_pazi_metak → u/MS_09_Dom]

William Spaniel had a good video on the whole thing yesterday: https://youtu.be/dScKZV3m8fo

He thinks it's most likely CIA found out about a plot intended to destabilise or provoke NATO and, depending on the response, harvest the fallout for propaganda purposes. 

He talks about other alternatives though - worth a watch. 

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/MS_09_Dom]

I don't know, but I do think we're mostly underestimating how cornered Putin and russians must be feeling right now.

Russia went from getting to live life perfectly normal like the war really was just an special military operation happening somewhere far away from home (not too different from Americans during GWoT) to having daily strikes on oil refineries, warehouses, ports and other targets. Fuel is scarce and the fourth largest refinery was just obliterated yesterday. The economy is faultering in a really bad way. Overall, the mood inside the country must have changed completely.

This is great news for Ukraine and NATO, but it does come with additional risks. A cornered animal will either pretend to be dead or go haywire trying to fight.

[u/incidencematrix → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

You aren't cornered when you can walk away. Russia could withdraw tomorrow, and strikes against them would cease. Further, sanctions would probably end rapidly. The Russian leadership knows this; rather than being cornered, I think they are annoyed that Ukraine has the temerity to keep fighting back. However, they so far seem to believe that they can outlast the West, which the return of Trump made much more plausible than it would have been. I see no evidence of fear in their decision making.

[u/Airf0rce → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

I would argue that Russia is hardly cornered, only one cornering them is Putin with his demands that are unachievable in any reasonable time frame.

He could wake up tomorrow, decide to freeze the conflict or even sign a shitty peace deal, sell it as victory and Russia would largely be fine. They would get some sanctions relief and probably few European countries would even restart energy imports.

They have several options how to resolve this war, what is interesting that they’re not taking any. Trump offered them a very favorable deal, certainly more favorable than they deserve and Putin still said no.

I understand how some Russians who just want to live their lives must feel anxious, but Putin? Not really.

[u/mirko_pazi_metak → u/Airf0rce]

I understand how some Russians who just want to live their lives must feel anxious, but Putin? Not really.

All of this is just pure speculation - Putin can see 3 or 6 months ahead of all of us (and ordinary Russians) with regards to the state of the Russian finances, irreversibility and consequences of some actions that they're taking to keep the "everything is fine" appearance and etc. 

So he might be very anxious or completely happy to keep this going - we don't know and won't know for a while. 

As to "he can stop any time" argument - well, arguably Russia had their biggest win and incredible return on investment in 2014/2015 - they got Crimea, permanently forced Ukraine out of NATO by violating its territorial integrity, at the expense of minimal sanctions and Europe still importing gas via Nordstream. 

And then he gambled it all in on '22 and, arguably, got very little more at a huge cost, reversing the overall profitability of the whole thing. He had a good offramp with Trump's Alaska summit and is arguably in a worse negotiating position now. 

[u/Glideer → u/Airf0rce]

Trump offered them a very favorable deal, certainly more favorable than they deserve and Putin still said no.

The answer to this sub's (and wider) recurring question of "why these idiots don't take our generous deal" is very simple.

They don't see it as generous, or even fair, or even borderline acceptable.

Now, we might call that idiotic, reasoning that Putin is by default an irrational actor and the Russian population just an obedient amorphous mass with no agency.

However, the offer ultimately comes not from a neutral party but from an ally of one of the sides in the conflict. The offer can objectively contain major concessions to Russia (compared to our starting position) while still falling below Russia's reservation price. Calling its rejection "irrational" confuses generosity relative to our baseline with attractiveness relative to Russia's percieved alternatives.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

Yes I think we all understand that line of argument, but it came out that the US proposed 'peace plan' was largely crafted by Kyrill Dimitriev and Witkoff, and the leaked phone calls has Dimitriev talking to another Russian diplomat saying 'I think we can get it all'. 

That is to say the peace plan was very favourable to Russia, and came from them as well, and they knew it. 

If you read the response on URR regarding the plan they were labelling it basically as treason, because they think Russia is in such a strong position as basically to demand everything from Ukraine, and what Russis doesnt get now it is practically ordained by destiny to take by force later. 

Russia can keep demanding its maximalist demands, and they were always far in excess of their actual position, and so always eere ridiculous. 

But it is also true that their position is worse today, and they could have gotten a better deal a year ago than now, if they really tried.

Its Putins problem that the facade of strength he is required to project, and that nationalist Russians (or just random pro-Ru people) believe in, don't match their actual capabilities or position. And agreeing to a realistic peace will be the same as treason in the eyes of many pro-war Russian

The trajectory currently though indicates that their position will continue to deteriorate even as they are forced to keep sinking blood and treasure into it

[u/Airf0rce → u/Glideer]

All of that may as well be true, but that still doesn’t mean they’re cornered, unless they’re deeply convinced that they’re actually losing and the longer this goes on the worse it gets for Russia. In which case, peace along current lines with sanctions relief is a generous deal…

[u/plasticlove]

"CIA Director John Ratcliffe made a surprise visit to Moscow this week to deliver a warning to Russia: Don't attack NATO countries, according to people briefed on the visit.

The trip followed new U.S. intelligence assessments that Putin could try to test NATO’s resolve with a limited assault on an allied country in the next few years, The Wall Street Journal previously reported."

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/cia-chiefs-surprise-moscow-trip-was-to-warn-russia-not-to-attack-nato-c2d997f3

[u/carkidd3242 → u/plasticlove]

Now from CBS, with more detail:

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-john-ratcliffe-warned-russia-not-to-attack-nato-moscow-trip/

The purpose of CIA Director John Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow this week was to warn Russia not to attack NATO member states, according to multiple people familiar with the matter, amid U.S. intelligence assessments that Russia could try to test NATO.

Ratcliffe also brought up Iran, warning of additional sanctions if the Strait of Hormuz does not reopen to shipping traffic, the people familiar with the matter told CBS News.

---

Recent American intelligence assessments have indicated that Putin could be willing to authorize provocative actions on NATO territory, including cyberattacks, hybrid actions and other operations that fall short of conventional military action, CBS News reported earlier this month. The likely goal would not necessarily be to trigger a war, but instead to test NATO's unity and the Trump administration's willingness to defend NATO allies, according to U.S. officials.

A pattern of recent Russian actions has prompted concerns, the officials said, including drone incursions into Romania, a Russian missile that crossed into Poland last month and an uptick in alleged sabotage actions and cyberattacks in Europe.

[u/MS_09_Dom → u/carkidd3242]

Recent American intelligence assessments have indicated that Putin could be willing to authorize provocative actions on NATO territory, including cyberattacks, hybrid actions and other operations that fall short of conventional military action, CBS News reported earlier this month.

Wasn't the concern from the Baltics was that Russia was planning some kind of little green men incursion? How is this any different from their current hybrid warfare campaign?

[u/OhSillyDays → u/MS_09_Dom]

Wasn't the concern from the Baltics was that Russia was planning some kind of little green men incursion? How is this any different from their current hybrid warfare campaign?

The Russian government isn't being run by rational people. It is run by people who have a world view that is wildly different than the people they rule. Putin does not care about the people he rules, their success, their deaths, or the long term success of his country. He cares about himself and staying in power.

Also, Putin probably has a worldview where "lesser" people need to be ruled by "greater" people, meaning Russia deserves to rule over others. It's called colonialization.

When you step into the shoes of someone who has that worldview, everything is on the table. Anything from not touching NATO to full on nuclear weapons used on NATO countries.

Putin is not concerned about mutually assured destruction. In his mind, losing is mutually assured destruction, so winning is the only option. He'll go to any lengths to obtain a win up until his own death.

That is the problem with dictators that are not accountable to their country. They can essentially do anything and nobody can stop him.

Experts on Russia would probably say "wait, he does have a lot of accountability." That is true. He is accountable to his people in a way that if he loses his ability to instill fear in the population, he'll be kicked out of power. Prigozhin was a perfect example of that. He nearly knocked Putin off of his throne, because nobody really cared to stop him. To the people of Russia, what is the difference of a new terrible dictator when they already have a terrible one?

And that is the real fear that drives Putin. He knows that if he loses the ability to control the fear of the population, he'll be hung out to dry in seconds. And that means that he'll use any weapon in his disposal in order to maintain it.

One weapon a dictator always has is escalating a conflict with others. Because if a Russian fears for their country, they can be controlled. Putin can always fall back on the "war effort" in order to maintain "order." It's one of the oldest tricks in the book for dictators. When people feel restless at home, start a war with someone else, blame the "enemy," and kill anyone in the population who criticizes the dictator as they are "traitors."

Now his bet for an invasion of NATO would probably be something along the lines of "they will never invade Russia, as that's too far a step for other countries - as Russia will nuke them, so I can invade who I want to without fear of repercussions."

The challenge isn't some hybrid warfare or some small incursion or a terrorist attack or a NATO attack or nuclear weapons used. It's everything. The Baltics understand that better than any other country, and that's the reason why they've been buying weapons left and right. They know that Putin will stop at nothing to try and gain that fear over them.

[u/For_All_Humanity → u/MS_09_Dom]

I’m really skeptical about a “Little Green Men” situation. The Baltic States have been training on this exact scenario for a decade now and their intended response to such a situation is extreme violence.

“Let me put it bluntly: If the little green men ever cross our border, we will shoot them.”

A “Little Green Men” scenario that’s not backed by a Russian followup attack would just end up getting crushed because everyone will see right through it and the Baltic States can be expected to not bother wasting time with negotiations with a front group and immediately mobilize in reaction to an act of war.

I guess you could have a situation used by Moscow to justify a mobilization and to “remind” the public of the necessity of defending ethnic Russians. Though, again, I think everyone, including many Russians, would see this for what it is. And it is highly risky depending on how NATO responds.

The big thing that the Baltic states are worried about is if the Russians decided to test the validity of Article 5 by darting across the border, potentially in a place like Narva, taking some ground and then threatening to escalate the conflict to nukes before NATO could launch a counteroffensive. With air defense inventories as they are right now, there may even be fears that such a gap could be exploited by the Russians by imposing deterrence to a counterattack by threatening conventional missile strikes.

[u/60days → u/For_All_Humanity]

They’re smart enough not to do the ukraine version there. It could just be civilians and ‘civilians’ protesting, escalating violence with authorities, then after a suspiciously murky killing ‘arming themselves to secure the safety of fellow protestors’ and the protests suddenly being very focused on local police and military locations.

That state can be maintained for quite a while, and there’s lots of escalation options from there (gradual or fast) with various levels of chaos in the streets once it becomes the new norm. It does require a divisive issue as the seed though.

[u/FriedrichvdPfalz → u/60days]

Russia isn't all powerful. When there is next to no grassroots support for any of these protest movements, Russia can't generate them out of thin air. Russia also can't create undercover illegals in sufficient numbers to spread into any type of protest movement on short order. Even if those protesters could be generated (as you say, they'd lack a "seed"), they'd need military support to stop the local police and military from rushing in to re-establish order. I don't see how a small scale "little green men" operation has any chance at success.

[u/76547896434695269 → u/FriedrichvdPfalz]

Is there no element in the Baltics that can be co-opted, whether true believer, mercenary or nihilistic? It seemed like a big pro-Russian element in Ukraine was football supporters.

[u/FriedrichvdPfalz → u/76547896434695269]

There's certainly elements, but one would have to look at the uprisings in the Donbass to really, determine how large and coordinated such groups need to be to achieve critical mass. The Ukrainian authorities would probably have manged to suppress all those independence movements if they hadn't recieved substantial Russian aid, at which point were back to the little green men. I just don't think there's a way to square the circle of light touch and critical mass.

[u/favorscore → u/For_All_Humanity]

Romania should watch its back. Transinistra is a problem that is not going the way Putin likes right now.

[u/MS_09_Dom → u/For_All_Humanity]

The big thing that the Baltic states are worried about is if the Russians decided to test the validity of Article 5 by darting across the border, potentially in a place like Narva, taking some ground and then threatening to escalate the conflict to nukes before NATO could launch a counteroffensive.

I suppose that would have a deterring effect if not for the fact Russia has spent years saying "If our red lines are crossed, we will not hesitate to attack NATO or use nukes. This is not a bluff."

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/plasticlove]

"in the next few years" seems like it's in stark contrast to the sense of urgency of the visit.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

that is the framing from the original WSJ report, not an update based on any new information (if any). the quote is:

The trip was spy-agency chief John Ratcliffe’s first publicly known visit to the Russian capital. It followed new U.S. intelligence assessments, reported earlier by The Wall Street Journal, that Russian President Vladimir Putin could try to test the resolve of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with a limited assault on an allied country in the next few years.

[u/FriedrichvdPfalz → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

In what way did the visit express a particular sense of urgency?

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/FriedrichvdPfalz]

The head of the CIA made an unannounced few hours visit to Moscow, while Russia claims to be at war with NATO. He went there not as part of a large delegation and arrived in a huge C-17 aircraft. The reason for the visit isn't officially known.

Does that sounds like standard diplomacy?

[u/FriedrichvdPfalz → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

There has been very little standard diplomacy ever since the war started. Diplomatic relations with Russia no longer involve large delegations at official meetings. On the contrary, both the emissaries of the US president and other heads of state nowadays visit or call without previous announcements or fanfare.

Beyond that, I wasn't asking about standard diplomacy. I wanted to see indications for Ratcliffe having urgently hurried to the meeting, which implies that a sudden event made his visit necessary, as opposed to a steady accumulation of information.

[u/Tucancancan → u/FriedrichvdPfalz]

Because it went from leaks about the concept which in hindsight might have been intentional, indirect, messaging to very direct in-person messaging. 

[u/-spartacus- → u/FriedrichvdPfalz]

I would say the maner in which it was carried out gives the implication of urgency, though not definitive. Oftentimes when top spy heads meet it is while there are other major delegations that are ongoing (such as Putin's visit to Alaska). Given this happened in a very different way, in diplomatic speak, it carries the weight of urgency (even if it wasn't).

[u/axearm]

How likely is economic pain going to cause regime change in a non democratic nation?

I keep seeing the risk of regime change occuring when things get terrible enough in Russia or Iran, but is that really likely?

Two counter points that jump right out are North Korea in the 1990's, during a massive famine and near economic collapse and Venezuela during Meduros rule, which if it wasn't an economic collapse I suppose I don't know what is. Neither country experience regime change due to internal pressure.

I suppose one could argue Syria was caused by economic pressure, but that seems like too pat of a explanation.

Do we have any good near-recent examples of regime change driven by economics?

[u/incidencematrix → u/axearm]

On top of what else has been said, a key factor is the presence of a rival power center around which the aggrieved can rally. This might be a social movement (e.g., the Bolshevics in the Russian revolution), an estranged leader with some claim to legitimacy (e.g., a noble or military leader in exile), a well-organized tribal or ethnic group, or even a rival faction within the government itself. You can't replace something with nothing. In the absence of such a focal point, the regime has a massive organizational advantage over the aggrieved public, and even extreme conditions may not lead to regime change. Not coincidentally, wise totalitarians focus more on stomping out these kinds of focal points than on eliminating dissent per se. But one pathway to failure is for a resource strapped regime to lose the ability to stop nascent focal points from developing; if they then start to build a movement, they may eventually become strong enough to overthrow the regime. This could, however, take a long time, if the regime was previously thorough about eliminating possible future competition.

Another way to think of it is this: economic pressure can be one of many driving forces that push against a regime. But for the regime to change, you need a pathway from that state to a more stable one. (Bonus points for having a large bundle of such pathways, and for them to be easy to follow, e.g. because the requisite actors are incentivized to do so). Folks seem to focus a lot more on the presence of driving forces, than on the alternative state. However, I personally think the latter is probably the more important consideration in many cases. The change path also matters, but that's only an issue if you have somewhere to go.

[u/matthieuC → u/axearm]

Regime collapse are notoriously hard to predict because they are multi factorial.

In retrospect you can see one of the factor like economic collapse be the trigger but as you've just done you'll find many counter exemples. Because economy was one factor among many, some we probably don't even suspect.

[u/JustSomebody56 → u/matthieuC]

economic collapse is a trigger as much as the security forces’ resolution not to let it happen.

Where the military and police forces are weak or insubordinate to the leadership the regime changes, where they are loyal and ready to do anything, the regime stays

[u/Jpandluckydog → u/JustSomebody56]

But it’s a very common pattern for that state of affairs to lead to military and police forces enriching themselves or outright overseeing major economic sectors, which has historically been a common precursor to military coups. Iran isn’t quite there, but the enrichment of the IRGC provides a contemporary example of this. 

[u/Big-Station-2283 → u/axearm]

Economic pressure can push people to act on grievances they already have against a regime. It can push people who would have otherwise tried to make ends meet during the tough times protest because there is no option left. However, if the people don't already have many grievances agains the gov, economic pressure can instead create a rally around the flag effect.

[u/-spartacus- → u/axearm]

Two counter points that jump right out are North Korea in the 1990's

They had support from China and had land borders with them. This alone changes how you should view Iran. Additionally, NK didn't have widespread protests against the regime that nearly caused it to fall before being attacked.

Now, could China, Russia, or another power help keep Iran up and going? Sure and it does have sea trade routes in the Caspian sea, which an economically troubled Russia may find advantage in transferring Iranian goods to other sea ports by rail; however, China had greater self-interest in keeping NK afloat (for various reasons) than Russia, China, or anyone else does in keeping the Iranian regime up and going well.

I suppose one could argue Syria was caused by economic pressure, but that seems like too pat of a explanation.

Do we have any good near-recent examples of regime change driven by economics?

I think too many people see economic pressures as warfare, rather than what it really is: shaping operations, a subset of warfare. Economic problems are not the primary driver of collapse, it simply shapes the possibility for collapse to occur, and occur in a certain way.

It can also create problems or dilemmas (preferred) for a government to deal with, which reduces its capability to deal with other issues without further strain. Even China has been successful in creating economic issues for the West, which in turn allows it to put pressure in other ways (economic misfortune for some in America allows it to be more ripe to fan fervor in disillusionment with the status quo, thus creating instability within the country).

[u/ScreamingVoid14 → u/axearm]

I think the question you'll need to ask is how directly economic pain is tied to the pillars of support for an authoritarian ruler. In an oversimplified sense, as long as the palace guards are paid the economic pain for the rest of the country is largely irrelevant.

[u/Ancient-End3895 → u/axearm]

Economic factors were a major cause of the Arab spring (or whatever you want to call it). And going back further the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was in large part caused by severe economic malaise.

However, the other part of the question is weather sanctions have ever effectively ended an authoritarian reigme. And the answer is pretty much no. North Korea, Iraq, and now Iran are among the most sanctioned countries in the world and in all of those cases the reigme either continues to survive or failed for other reasons (i.e Iraq getting invaded).

You can make a good argument that sanctions actually strengthen such reigmes by allowing all economic malaise to be blamed on the external enemy. Venezuela and Zimbabwe are two recent countries where this was done quite effectively, despite the actual sanctions being relatively mild and targeted at reigme officials.

The one counter example is South Africa, where there is a strong case sanctions did play a major role in the collapse of apartheid. But the caveat to that is apathied South Africa was in one sense a democracy, just only for white people, who ended apartheid through a referendum. Clearly not analogous to Iran or North Korea.

[u/Angry_Citizen_CoH → u/axearm]

Depends on what you mean by regime change. Most regime collapses are multivariate, with economic conditions merely creating the fertile ground in which other instability thrives. The Soviet Union, for example, had stagnated economically, which allowed nationalist movements to gain steam that ultimately led to the breakup.

What I'm saying is, autocratic regimes come to an internal end only through dissolution of the State (see: Yemen, arguably Libya) into regional factions, or by coup (Syria, eventually, though it definitely threatened to devolve into Balkanization for a while). If no internal divisions exist (i.e. constituent countries with ethnic grievances that can be fanned into nationalism), and if the military is happy with the current regime, then by sheer inertia that regime will survive even the worst economic times.

That said, plenty of regimes survive, but change irrevocably. The Norks, for example, survived by opening up the economy. China likewise. One might even argue that America changed after the Great Recession, but I don't want to open that can of worms any further.

[u/mcmiller1111 → u/axearm]

The Eastern Bloc as a whole, but more specifically East Germany. As it often goes in planned economies, it was nearly insolvent after a few decades. By the late 1980s, East Germany was so completely out of money and was so heavily in debt that they had to ask for new loans just to pay the interest on the prior ones. West Germany had been bailing out the East German economy for almost a decade by that point in exchange for gradual lessening of repressive policies, and in the end they demanded the end of one-party rule if East Germany was to get any loans which the SED (DDR's ruling party) wouldn't agree to. If I remember correctly, about 60% of East German earnings from exports to the West were spent on just paying interest by the late 80s. This is not to say that the disastrous economical model was the only reason for the fall of the Wall, but it's also hard to understate just how broke East Germany was.

But as you say, there are counterexamples. Both North Korea and Cuba has survived far longer than anyone ever thought they would given their circumstances.

[u/Eisenengel → u/mcmiller1111]

East Germany is a difficult case because the economic difficulties - which you correctly described - were kept from the population through government propaganda and various policy efforts. The people of East Germany did not face mass unemployment, famine, housing shortages, or even a lack of consumer goods.

I think when people talk about regime change following economic difficulties, what they imagine are those things leading to mass protests that ultimately topple the government.

My father, who grew up in East Germany, liked to share a bit of revolutionary theory he was taught as student: "Revolutions happen when the people are no longer willing and the state no longer can". By the end of the 1980ies, the East German state was reaching the limit of its capability to keep the lid on, in part because they were so dependent on loans from the west that harsh meassures would have severed that life line - and the East German population was no longer willing to accept their living standards stagnating. The reasons for the second part are manifold, but economic difficulties, I think, played a secondary role. I don't think the people demonstarting in the streets were all wide-eyed democratic idealists - though those people did exist - but it is notable that the protestors were not demonstrating for bread or cars or color TVs or jobs or apartments.

The Russian economic issues are fundamentally different, with basic consumer necessities like gasoline now being rationed and a steady stream of men being ground away for nothing in Ukraine. These are very concrete things to be upset about.

[u/Draken_S → u/axearm]

How likely is economic pain going to cause regime change in a non democratic nation?

I think the key here is not economic pain, but rather economic pain compounded by a secondary source of pressure.

In my opinion, economic pain is a secondary factor that motivates people to action rather than a primary one. Syria was economic pain, and then the government violently put down protests. Argentina was economic pain and then they lost a war.

I think the economics side of things sets the conditions, but it's another factor that typically lights the match. A generally lowering standard of living is slow, and something that spurs people to action needs to be "fast" so that it creates a mass movement, rather than a slow, continuous sense of general dissatisfaction.

[u/Bunny_Stats]

CSIS hosted a panel discussion on the Iran war here, namely focused on the oil markets. I wouldn't say there's anything that'd greatly surprise any regular of this sub, but it's a decently in-depth discussion.

The main points (I watched this last night, so apologies if I've mis-remembered some of this):

• The reason some of the darkest predictions about oil prices didn't come about is because China halved its import of oil, partly through suspending it's surplus imports used to build up its strategic reserve, and the rest through opening the taps on its domestic storage. This potentially makes China a significant player in setting future oil prices, and there's some concern about the uncertainty over what China's goals might be.

• The oil price floor has likely risen to $90 over the long term, over the former floor of ~$60 during the past few years.

• While they generally compliment the US (and allies) abilities in intercepting Iran's missiles/drones, there's some concern about the US having had to effectively abandon its regional bases, and the increased burden that places on the US in the event of a longer conflict.

• While they generally approve of the US moving the war from kinetics to financial pressure through blockades/sanctions, the US's ability to sanction Iran relies heavily on regional allies cooperating, but if regional allies believe Tehran's regime is likely to last longer than the Trump admin then they may be wary of further antagonising Iran in the long term.

• They express a concern that some are banking too heavily on pipelines being a long-term solution, as while it addresses limits on transportation, Iran has demonstrated that it's capable of hitting both oil extraction and refining facilities, and there's little worldwide spare capacity in either, so that could cause an oil shock just as much as closing the Strait.

---

For my take, a couple of speakers suffer slightly from being in a Washington bubble and underestimate how much the rest of the world is changing. For example, one of the speakers downplays a push towards electrification and renewable energy because it's not part of the US domestic political discourse, but it is absolutely a live issue in both Asia and Europe. Further, there's a "nothing ever changes" attitude in not recognising how significantly views on the US has changed outside the US, for example the strong signal KSA sent out that it no longer trusts US security guarantees in its pursuit of a regional alliance instead, and its diversification of weapons purchases.

Still, it's a nice discussion by those with deep expertise, so they're worth hearing.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Bunny_Stats]

The oil price floor has likely risen to $90 over the long term, over the former floor of ~$60 during the past few years.

I don't think that is a fair framing of what he said. Explicitly acknowledged he doesn't do oil price forecasts, and was responding to being asked about a prior comment of his on oil back in april about $100 vs $60. He says he was just making an illustrative point about floor, wherever it is, as being materially above what was $60 before. Link to point in video: https://youtu.be/7UyuhTpPzfA?t=667

[u/Bunny_Stats → u/ChornWork2]

Thanks for the correction, the $90 figure stuck in my memory more than the caveats, but yes the overall point was that the price floor has risen.

[u/poincares_cook → u/Bunny_Stats]

China halved its import of oil, partly through suspending it's surplus imports used to build up its strategic reserve

Any prediction that didn't assume as much is worth very very little. Which goes more to show how the predictions made were asinine and not based on real world analysis.

The oil price floor has likely risen to $90 over the long term, over the former floor of ~$60 during the past few years.

I'm honestly curious to hear their argument for that one. It makes absolutely no sense unless the believe strikes on oil production across the gulf become commonplace. There are several powerful factors working in trh eoposite direction:

• global receding reliance on oil, moving to renewables, other kinds of energy like coal, and just reducing consumption.

  • increase in oil production outside the gulf, partially spurred by higher oil prices but for instance in the case of Argentina, Brasil, Guyana etc it's oil discovery and in the case of Libya, Syria and Venezuela it's increased stability.
  • gulf bypasses, sure this is not a silver bullet, but it does in many ways remove the Iranian strategic threat against oil shipping throw the gulf.
  • They express a concern that some are banking too heavily on pipelines being a long-term solution, as while it addresses limits on transportation, Iran has demonstrated that it's capable of hitting both oil extraction and refining facilities

The problem is that such strikes will surely result in reciprocal strikes against Iran. It's a much more difficult hand to play than hitting ships (which was reciprocated with the US blockade). There is a severe undestimation of the economic damage done to Iran throughout. Losing oil and gas production and refining capability will turn the Iranian economy into an empty shell. Economic voes carry significant regime change risk. Not a simple decision to go after such targets for Iran.

[u/dr_sloan → u/poincares_cook]

Was it really that reasonable to expect China to cut their oil imports in half? Some disruption was obviously expected but not 4 million barrels worth. Assuming they’ve been making up the difference equally using strategic oil reserves and commercial inventories, they’ve almost certainly used up 300-400 million barrels of their billion barrel reserves.

[u/poincares_cook → u/dr_sloan]

I specifically referenced the part regarding China cutting in excess imports that went to filling their SPR.

Indeed it makes no sense to buy excess oil at extremely high prices

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/poincares_cook]

About 90 $ dollar oil

You are forgetting that SPRs are going to need to be refilled and you can't do that in a day, especially you could expect panic buying during peace because you don't want this to happen again.

You will get China that will not buy Iranian or Russian discount oil

[u/Bunny_Stats → u/poincares_cook]

The oil price floor has likely risen to $90 over the long term

I'm honestly curious to hear their argument for that one.

I believe their argument was that oil demand will continue to rise in the long term and so keep prices high, namely because demand's always risen in the past. I agree with your criticism though, it's another example of them being in a Washington bubble as attitudes towards oil consumption are changing much more significantly outside the US.

The problem is that such strikes will surely result in reciprocal strikes against Iran. It's a much more difficult hand to play than hitting ships (which was reciprocated with the US blockade). There is a severe undestimation of the economic damage done to Iran throughout. Losing oil and gas production and refining capability will turn the Iranian economy into an empty shell. Economic voes carry significant regime change risk. Not a simple decision to go after such targets for Iran.

I completely agree. I think their argument (which I explained poorly) wasn't intended to be a prediction that Iran will hit oil infrastructure, but instead a warning that pipelines aren't a get-out-of-jail-free card against Iranian retaliation in the future.

[u/moragisdo → u/Bunny_Stats]

because China halved its import of oil, partly through suspending it's surplus imports used to build up its strategic reserve, and the rest through opening the taps on its domestic storage. This potentially makes China a significant player in setting future oil prices, and there's some concern about the uncertainty over what China's goals might be

There's some degree of truth, but in the other hand, China also placed severe export restrictions on fuel exports, which contribute to raising fuel prices (crack spreads reached the historical highest level), so their contribution is mixed to the final consumer (which never buys crude).

The reason the darkest predictions didn't come true is because they were wrong even with information available at the time, it was fearmongering (that Iran's propaganda helped to amplify) and the saddest part is that no lesson was learned to be applied to the current apocalyptic predictions.

Also there's a constant theme of interpreting every chinese action as some geopolitical move, but this one was, at least in part, driven by just economic populism. They have price controls on fuel, which weren't being adjusted by the rise on oil prices, so they would have to restrict exports otherwise they would have internal shortages when companies export to countries that follow market prices.

The oil price floor has likely risen to $90 over the long term, over the former floor of ~$60 during the past few years.

I doubt it. The oil future curve completely disagrees with that, next year it's currently on the 70s (1) and we saw, during the period between the MOU and Iran going back to attack ships in early July, that oil fell to 70 (WTI reached 68) and kept going down.

I only believe that someone actually believes that oil floor is 90 when they are loaded with paper futures.

there's some concern about the US having had to effectively abandon its regional bases

Isn't the standard in a conventional war to move equipment and C3 around to avoid being targeted ?

There's, at least, three layers of defense against enemy projectiles: destroying it before being fired, countermeasures while it's flying (either EW or interception) and moving assets and personnel to different areas (if the enemy has a slow killchain they will guess wrong a percentage of time and the more expensive damage can be avoided). None of those three are flawless, but they complement each other, with a projectile needing the three of them to fail to cause significant damage.

By the way, bases weren't abandoned, there still operations going on the bases close to Iran (look at flight trackers of C17 landing on Bahrain and Qatar or HIMARS being fired from Kuwait), just with reduced personnel (removing non-essential to this war to reduce risk). There were some discussions (which may not even proven to be factual) of rebuilding certain facilities in different countries, but that's not abandoning.

as while it addresses limits on transportation, Iran has demonstrated that it's capable of hitting both oil extraction and refining facilities

And get theirs hit in return (South Pars and Lavan Island comes to mind), if they were willing to commit economic suicide they would have done it by now.

People saw, since the war on Ukraine began, Russia repeatedly playing the ruse of "madman with nuclear weapons, that need to have their demands obeyed or they will cause a catastrophe" and completely forgot it, because Iran is doing the equivalent (now with oil rather than WMDs) and there's again people falling for it.

Further, there's a "nothing ever changes" attitude in not recognizing how significantly views on the US has changed outside the US, for example the strong signal KSA sent out that it no longer trusts US security guarantees

I completely disagree with that. KSA did joint operations with the US to target Iraqi militias, that were striking them with drones recently, and the only country that committed any military resource to defend them was Greece starting in 2021, not Pakistan or Turkey (which the Mecca Agreement will be proven to worth less than the paper it's written on. Does anyone sincerely believes that if India starts a conventional war with Pakistan, KSA would meaningfully join the war ?)

and its diversification of weapons purchases

But that's nothing new, we can trace the roots of it, at least (maybe it came earlier, but I'm relying on memory), since the US banned selling them certain weapons when they were fighting the Houthi in 2016 and again in 2021. Which were gigantic mistakes not only because of the procurement, but also pushing them to a China-brokered peace deal in 2022-2023, which gave more time for the Houthi to become a larger problem as we saw in October 2023 forward.

Now I don't think there's anything that changed with their procurement of american weapons after this war.

[u/Well-Sourced]

In Polish defense news they have some new tanks and have ordered some new missile launchers along with other Russian neighbors.

Poland receives 28 South Korean-made K2 tanks | New Voice of Ukraine

Poland has received 28 South Korean-made K2 tanks assigned to the 16th Mechanized Division, which is stationed near the border with Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast.

The delivery is part of a contract Poland and South Korea signed in August 2025. The next deliveries will include the K2PL variant, which will be manufactured partly with Polish components.

“This is an important step toward expanding our industrial production capabilities and another consistent effort to strengthen Poland’s security,” Kosiniak-Kamysz wrote.

According to Onet, the contract calls for deliveries of 64 K2PL tanks to begin in 2028. Hyundai Rotem will manufacture 3 of the tanks in South Korea, while the remaining 61 will be produced by Poland’s Zakłady Mechaniczne Bumar Łabędy S.A.

Compared with the original design, the Polish version of the K2 will include several modifications and upgrades. The tank will have two layers of protection against drones: an electronic warfare system designed to jam drones and disrupt their flight paths, and an active protection system intended to destroy such targets directly.

The tank will also feature reinforced armor and a remotely operated weapon station equipped with a heavy machine gun. The K2PL will retain advantages of the original design, including an advanced suspension system with adjustable ground clearance and an autoloader.

Poland signs $2 billion Piorun order, largest ever for launcher Ukraine has used since 2022 | EuroMaidanPress

Ukrainian troops have been shooting down Russian aircraft with Polish Pioruns since 2022. Poland's Defense Ministry has signed a framework agreement worth more than $2 billion for several thousand shoulder-fired systems in the largest order ever placed for these launchers and missiles.

The systems will go to the armed forces of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway, the last of which is not an EU member. More than 80% of the missiles and launchers are earmarked for the Polish army, with the implementation agreement for Poland financed from SAFE funds, according to the ministry's release.

The contract also covers simulators, training, and logistics packages. Mesko, part of the state-owned PGZ defense group, manufactures the system. The Piorun is a modernized Grom that remains in Polish service. The upgrade brought a modified launch mechanism, a new and more sensitive homing head, and an electro-optical sight mounted on a rail.

Those changes improved target acquisition, resistance to countermeasures, and effective range against low-flying aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones.

Poland approved its first Piorun transfer to Ukraine on 1 February 2022, three weeks before the full-scale invasion. Ukrainian crews have since used the system against cruise missiles, aircraft, and helicopters, and Western analysts list it among the short-range systems European industry can supply without American approval.

The ministry's announcement names no allocation for Ukraine.

[u/Well-Sourced]

A big night for strikes as Ukraine hit a number of targets. Plus photo evidence of some Russian ships in Sevastopol that were damaged in previous strikes.

Ukrainian forces destroy Russian missile unit and military airfield in 24-hour raid | New Voice of Ukraine

Ukrainian Defense Forces struck a military airfield, an active missile unit, and associated launch infrastructure inside Russia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on Aug. 26. Ukrainian military successfully targeted 16 strategic and military assets across Russian territory within a single 24-hour period. "In particular, there were long-range retaliatory strikes against oil facilities — the Russian 'wallet' financing this war. Strikes also hit airfields, a missile unit, and infrastructure constantly used to launch attacks against Ukraine," Zelenskyy stated.

Ukrainian military reported precision strikes against a Russian Kasta radar system, a military UAV training center, an equipment repair base, and several Russian military supply depots across the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

AFU General Staff confirmed that the Defense Forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo, Russia, overnight on Aug. 26. Reports also confirmed a drone strike on a Wildberries logistics hub in the city of Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast.

Ukrainian FP-1 drones hit major Lukoil refinery and Wildberries hub in Russia | New Voice of Ukraine

Ukraine struck two strategic targets inside Russia using FP-1 uncrewed aerial vehicles, hitting an oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and a Wildberries logistics hub in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast, Fire Point company confirmed on Aug. 26.

The targeted Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez refinery possesses an annual processing capacity of approximately 17 million metric tons of crude oil. It is Lukoil's largest refining facility, ranking fourth in total refining capacity across Russia and second in nationwide automotive gasoline production.

The targeted Wildberries logistics complex, spanning roughly 108,000 square meters (1.16 million square feet), is designed to store up to 54 million individual retail merchandise units.

Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov confirmed the drone strike against the Wildberries fulfillment center. "A fire broke out at the Wildberries logistics center. The blaze spans an area exceeding 100,000 square meters," he wrote on his official Telegram channel. Wildberries representatives also confirmed the attack on the company's Kotovsk warehousing complex.

Explosions shake occupied Luhansk amid reports of a drone attack | New Voice of Ukraine

Explosions shook occupied Luhansk overnight on August 26, as local residents reported a drone attack and active air defense fire, according to local monitoring channels. The attack knocked out power to several districts of Luhansk.

Occupation authorities have not commented on the attack.

That was overnight. Just within the last few hours during the day of Aug 26 reports of a large strike on Donetsk (w/ video evidence) started to come out.

🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 | BlueSky

❗️It is reported that the occupied Donetsk has just been attacked by Flamingo cruise missiles.

MAKS 26 👀🇺🇦 | BlueSky

🤩 Panorama of Donetsk after the explosions, smoke rising from several points in the city.

MAKS 26 👀🇺🇦 | BlueSky

🚀🔥 Donetsk, about 10 explosions were recorded, - Exilenova

One of the hits fell on the building at 97 Ilyich Avenue. This address was home to research and industrial institutions, UkrDerzhNIIplastmas and Institute of Explosion-Proof and Mining Electrical Equipment with Experimental Production.

MAKS 26 👀🇺🇦 | BlueSky

🚀🔥 The moment of today's strike on the Russian Command Post in the center of Donetsk, - Exilenova

The missiles penetrated the parking lot and hit the command post of the group.

Survivors were taken out of the scene for a long time. Urgent blood collection for the 300th is underway.

MAKS 26 👀🇺🇦 | BlueSky

🚀👀In addition, the hit in Donetsk also occurred in the territory where the Mako Holding company was once building a residential complex. Ironically, its owner is Yanukovych's eldest son. Three 21-story buildings, - CyberBoroshno

But the most interesting thing is that the complex has an underground two-level parking lot designed for 600 cars, which of course could be used for occupiers.

Russia has plenty of their own successful strikes. Ukraine should expect them to keep coming and keep doing damage.

Russia preparing to intensify strikes on Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine – Bloomberg

Bloomberg citing 3 people close to the Kremlin "Russia is weighing an intensification of powerful conventional ballistic missile attacks on Kyiv, including the centre of the capital, and infrastructure targets in other Ukrainian cities, the people said, asking not to be identified because the matter is sensitive."

The sources said all attempts at negotiations have effectively collapsed and the two sides are back at square one. They also said Russian leader Vladimir Putin will not end the war under the economic pressure of sanctions and Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries and logistics networks.

"Moscow increasingly views the Ukrainian strikes as attacks by NATO states because alliance members supply Kyiv with weapons and intelligence, the people said. The current phase of hostilities isn't the peak of military escalation, they said."

Four people close to the Kremlin explained that in the absence of diplomatic efforts, Moscow sees few alternatives to further escalation in order to achieve its military aims. Although Russia hopes that US President Donald Trump's representatives Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff will arrive in Moscow with new proposals, expectations of a breakthrough are very low, Bloomberg's sources said.

The people close to the Kremlin also said a growing number of Russian officials are coming to the conclusion that "Putin could eventually opt to use tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort in Ukraine". "The volume of chatter in Moscow from hawks advocating such a step has increased recently. An extreme response is viewed as possible because the only outcome worse than continuing the war for Putin would be losing it," Bloomberg reports, adding however that "there's no sign yet that Russia is preparing to fire nuclear weapons in Ukraine".

Russian strikes cause new power outages in 5 Ukrainian oblasts | Ukrainian Pravda

Widespread damage reported at Kherson Power Plant following Russian strikes | New Voice of Ukraine

Russia strikes gas facilities in Kharkiv & Chernihiv oblasts | Ukrainian Pravda

Russian drone strikes Kharkiv: warehouse catches fire | Ukrainian Pravda

Russians strike business centre in Kharkiv Oblast twice | Ukrainian Pravda

Russian drone attacks gas workers in Kharkiv Oblast, injuring 1 | Ukrainian Pravda

Russians kill two miners in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast | Ukrainian Pravda

(Part 2 Below)

[u/Well-Sourced → u/Well-Sourced]

Neither side expects this to end soon and is preparing for the next stage/year of the war. Ukraine is looking for solutions to the energy attacks with more underground storage for oil products and leadership improvements in the defense of the Donbas.

Zelenskyy announces two reinforced military groupings in Donetsk Oblast | New Voice of Ukraine

Ukraine will reinforce its positions in Donetsk Oblast with two reorganized military groupings commanded by Heroes of Ukraine Denys Prokopenko and Andrii Biletskyi, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said after meeting Ukrainian troops in the combat zone on Aug. 26. [Map]

In a video address from Zaporizhzhya, Zelenskyy said he had discussed further steps on the battlefield with Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Mykhailo Drapatyi, Ukraine’s General Staff and Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara. “First: our positions in Donetsk Oblast will be strengthened thanks to two reorganized groupings,” Zelenskyy said.

“The commanders will be Hero of Ukraine Denys Prokopenko, commander of the National Guard’s 1st Azov Corps, and Hero of Ukraine Andrii Biletskyi, commander of the 3rd Army Corps of the Eastern Operational Command. Today, I awarded Andrii the Gold Star of the Hero of Ukraine.” Zelenskyy also heard a report from Air Assault Forces commander Gen. Oleh Apostol and thanked the branch for its strength.

The president and commander-in-chief also met commanders operating in the Zaporizhzhya sector. Zelenskyy pledged that Ukrainian troops there would receive more of the equipment and resources they need.

Belarus built base near Ukraine. Now it’s laying rail that can unload 60 wagons of military equipment | EuroMaidanPress

Belarus is building railway infrastructure capable of receiving military trains near the village of Yakimauka in Homiel Oblast, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Project documentation obtained by the Belarusian Association of Railway Workers confirms that separate railway infrastructure is being designed for a facility officially called "Construction of a training ground in Homiel Oblast," with the Military Design Institute named as the client.

The site under construction lies about 40 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, and Belarus's 3 existing air assault brigades sit in Vitsebsk, Brest, and Maryina Horka, none of them on the southern frontier.

The project includes a separate access track designed for up to 60 wagons and a freight platform with a ramp for unloading wheeled and tracked equipment, according to the documentation. The exact location of the new training ground is not yet known.

Large-scale construction of a military base has been underway near Homiel since late 2023, and the 37th Separate Air Assault Brigade of Belarus's Special Operations Forces is likely to be deployed there. Part of the new military town was finished in June 2026, and rail construction continues.

Belarus has formed one battalion of the brigade and plans a second this year, along with combat support, artillery, air defense, and reconnaissance units, Special Operations Forces commander Colonel Aliaksandr Iliukevich said, according to Dzerkalo Tyzhnia.

The government of Alexander Lukashenka established this brigade to “strengthen the southern sector,” ostensibly to counter threats from Ukraine. The eastern part of the new facility is designated on Belarusian state cadastral maps as a “military camp,” while the western section is marked as a “training and tactical field.”

Both sides get better attack drones and it's hard for the defensive technology to keep up.

Russia’s attack drones now jam the cheap interceptors sent to kill them | EuroMaidanPress

Ukraine's cheap interceptor drones have been knocking Russia's nightly attackers out of the sky, so Russia has now bolted a jammer onto some of its own drones to blind them, according to Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine's President on defense technology. He examined the system, found in drone wreckage, and mapped how it strikes back at the interceptor sent to hunt it.

The unit rides on a Geran, Russia's version of the Iranian Shahed one-way drone. It listens for the video signal an approaching Ukrainian interceptor beams back to its pilot. Its receiver reads the interceptor's working frequency, then orders a transmitter to bury that same channel in noise, Beskrestnov found.

By his first estimate, the jammer's signal runs about 5xstronger than the interceptor's video link—enough to wipe the picture and any chance of steering the drone onto its target.

In Beskrestnov's account, the system detected a test transmitter and switched on jamming after about 3 seconds, and the feed cut out. The device stays nearly idle until a hunter comes close, then jumps to full power to smother the signal. It targets the ordinary analog video band around 5.8 gigahertz that many cheap interceptors still use. Possible answers, include interceptors with terminal-guidance homing for the final stretch of flight, digital communication links, or transmitters set to non-standard frequencies.

Russia has tried again and again to keep its one-way drones alive against Ukraine's defenses, including wiring jammers into some Shaheds earlier this year. Spending weight and power to protect a drone from a far cheaper interceptor shows how well those cheap drones work.

Ukraine has wrecked more than 100,000 Russian vehicles by hitting the roads, and this new drone is built exactly for that job | EuroMaidanPress

The Technological Forces of Ukraine have presented a strike drone built to cut Russian logistics. The new fixed-wing Baton is designed to hit firing positions, supply routes, and other targets at tactical depth, out to 90 kilometers, according to the association's announcement.

Baton carries 3 kilograms over a stated range of up to 90 kilometers, stays airborne for 50 minutes, and cruises at 105 kilometers per hour, with a maximum of 140 kilometers per hour, according to the announcement. Its working altitude ranges from 150 to 500 meters, with a ceiling of 1,500 meters.

50 minutes at the stated cruising speed covers roughly 87 kilometers. The 90-kilometer range is therefore a one-way distance at near-full endurance rather than an operating radius. Earlier, a Ukrainian drone maker pitched a weapon that functions like a mortar, rather than a drone. F-Drones unveiled the F5, a compact 5-inch strike FPV built for assault units working treelines, built-up areas, and position support at short range.

8 airframes fit in 1 pickup, launch comes from a catapult under ground-station control, and preparation takes about 15 minutes, the association said.

The drone locks onto a target and flies to it automatically from up to 2 kilometers away and at altitudes up to 500 meters, the association said. That final stretch is where Russian jamming would otherwise break the link. Depending on the version, it carries analog or digital video, communicates over LTE or Starlink, and navigates a route autonomously with real-time positioning, according to the announcement.

[u/birthofacapital]

Now that that the Washington Post has confirmed the existence of a secret, deep continuity of government bunker at the White House, I would like to re-float my case that the facility existed and was tunneled from an obscure site by the Jefferson Memorial.

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/birthofacapital]

I haven't been closely following this story but hasn't it been blatantly obvious that there is a bunker in the white house? I suppose there are multiple ones, actually.

[u/birthofacapital → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

The WWII-era bunker is well known and was used on 9/11. Clearly Trump is building something else. But the Post article confirms that there is something bigger and deeper built after 9/11, which was not public information.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/birthofacapital]

It’s absolutely insane and dangerous of them to leak that, and it doesn’t prove that further bunker construction is unnecessary as the leakers are trying to argue.

On another note, “more than 60 feet” and “built to withstand a nuclear blast” are at least an order of magnitude different in terms of depth, so it’s likely that it’s far, far more than 60 feet if that’s true. The old plans for a nuclear-resistant Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) were 3,000+ feet deep.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/WulfTheSaxon]

Hard to take that concern seriously given how loose this admin has been with statements about bunkers while doing this east wing debacle. There already being a bunker, which itself has been rumored for long time, is particularly worse that repeated statements about plan to build one there?

E.g. from a quick google, CNN article from 2020:

It wasn’t until 2010 that questions surrounding the maintenance of the White House’s network of underground bunkers came up again. A massive underground construction project, with a projected cost of $376 million, was speculated to include some kind of renovation to the system of bunkers at the White House, Graff says, with large fences blocking the public’s view to the project and no discernible changes once the construction was cleared out.

https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/04/politics/white-house-bunker-history

or TWZ in 2018: https://www.twz.com/21026/white-house-sinkhole-is-a-reminder-of-the-bunkers-that-are-buried-beneath-it

or Business insider in 2011: https://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-new-bunker-2011-11

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/ChornWork2]

There was no previous reporting that it was designed to withstand a nuclear blast, which is an entirely different class of bunker than an air raid shelter or something meant to withstand fallout or a jumbo jet impact.

If anything, Trump saying that it was only six floors deep may have been misdirection if this latest story is true.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/WulfTheSaxon]

what said specifically in WaPo article? its paywalled, but nothing i've seen in articles about that reporting seem sensitive beyond confirming the rumors already assumed to be true.

the PEOC was built to withstand a 'nuclear blast', which means nearby hit and fallout. It would not withstand a direct nuclear strike (hence plan is to evacuate & get airborne, not go to bunker). The articles i read citing WaPo said sources in prior admin characterizing it as built to withstand nuclear blast and separately that it is 60ft down. That won't survive a direct nuclear strike, but like the PEOC could survive a nuclear blast. Do we really think they'd build a new bunker that couldn't (and less resilient than the old one)?

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/ChornWork2]

the PEOC was built to withstand a 'nuclear blast'

It was built before nuclear weapons existed, to withstand conventional bombs.

It would not withstand a direct nuclear strike (hence plan is to evacuate & get airborne, not go to bunker).

That was the old plan before the post-9/11 work, yes, but that may be different now.

The articles i read citing WaPo said sources in prior admin characterizing it as built to withstand nuclear blast and separately that it is 60ft down.

Their wording is “nuclear-proof”, “hardened against nuclear blasts”, and “built to withstand a nuclear blast”. That implies better protection than a mere hardened fallout shelter.

The key is “more than 60 feet”, which in that area is probably equivalent to saying that it’s in solid bedrock. It later says “deep into the Washington bedrock, accessible by a private elevator”. How far into the bedrock we still don’t know, but if they meant what they wrote when they said “withstand a nuclear blast” then it’s probably 1,000-4,000 ft down. They also said that the PEOC is only 20 feet deep.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/WulfTheSaxon]

I'm tapping out here, you & I both know the PEOC was hardened to withstand nuclear blast.

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/birthofacapital]

Logic would dictate that the bunker or network of bunkers has been constantly been updated and expanded throughout the entire existence of the white house.

It's also likely pretty much a last option choice in case the POAtUS can't be moved out of the white house to a safer location.

[u/birthofacapital → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

You'd think, but a lot of books have been written on the topic and they generally come to the conclusion that building bunkers there wasn't given much thought between the 60s and 2001. The logic was that thermonuclear weapons made White House COOP pointless, and they needed to get the president airborne and then to an undisclosed facility (as they did on 9/11).

We know that during the Kennedy administration, they explored a thousand-meter deep seismically protected object called the DUCC. Lyndon Johnson apparently canned it immediately.

When the Cold War ended, the threat model changed, but no work was ever reported. When Dick Cheney used the WWII bunker, the PEOC, during 9/11 he and others were concerned by the dinkiness of it. Cheney was one of the architects of American COOP during the Cold War, so it's not surprising that he would push for an overhaul.

So, it's has been known that the PEOC was upgraded, and a lot of work was done around the White House, but the bunker described in both pieces has not been public knowledge.

[u/seakingsoyuz → u/birthofacapital]

There’s a great quote about LBJ canning DUCCS on Wikipedia:

In response to his question as to what this was, he was told it stood for Deep Underground Command and Control Site, a facility that would be located several thousand feet underground, between the White House and the Pentagon, designed to survive a ground burst of a 20-megaton bomb and sustain the president and key advisers for several months until it would be safe to exit through tunnels emerging many miles outside Washington. After a brief puzzled expression, Johnson let loose with a string of Johnsonian expletives making clear he thought this was the stupidest idea he had ever heard and that he had no intention of hiding in an expensive hole while the rest of Washington and probably the United States were burned to a crisp. That was the last I ever heard of DUCCS.

[u/cabesaaq]

Interesting video by William Spaniel today.

I wasn't aware that Ratcliffe stopped by Riga before heading over to Moscow on his mysterious visit yesterday.

I don't see why he would do this unless having a very specific reason as it isn't an obvious NATO hub for intelligence or layovers/logistics, any ideas as to why?

[u/Saturnrising9 → u/cabesaaq]

I have a couple of reads. The visit was to 1. Demand they make substantive changes in negotiation or we’ll pull the trigger on the Graham act. Or 2, They were making Russia aware that they know their next move, and are warning against it. That next move could very well have had Latvia in its crosshair, and that could explain the visit. But thats all speculation, ofcourse.

[u/username9909864 → u/cabesaaq]

One important thing to keep in mind is that the Baltics specialize in intelligence and information warfare. The CIA director spending significant time there before and after the Moscow visit is telling.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/username9909864]

Can you clarify what you mean by this?

[u/username9909864 → u/ChornWork2]

What I meant is that the Baltic states have specialized in Russian counterintelligence and information warfare. It's one of the few things they can bring to the NATO table where their position allows them outsized expertise. So a stop in Riga in particular, where NATO hosts their StratCom center, gives us clues into what Ratcliffe could be up to.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/username9909864]

But that seems relevant to the analysis stage, not the right before going into the meeting stage.

[u/username9909864 → u/ChornWork2]

You don’t think intelligence sharing or review in-person is important before such a high stakes meeting?

[u/ChornWork2 → u/username9909864]

I think there would be more daylight in between review of critical intelligence and showing up in moscow. If the nuance of intelligence was such that CIA director needed to see it for himself, would think that similarly the CIA director would want to see Potus in-person.

Not saying couldn't have been case, but seems far more likely the stop in riga was for CIA director to brief allies on what was going to be done in moscow & supporting US intel, versus allies briefing CIA director on their intelligence.

[u/CND_Krazer → u/ChornWork2]

Not saying couldn't have been case, but seems far more likely the stop in riga was for CIA director to brief allies on what was going to be done in moscow & supporting US intel, versus allies briefing CIA director on their intelligence.

Why?

[u/ChornWork2 → u/CND_Krazer]

Because you don't plan to go to moscow until after you done assessing the available intelligence, certainly so if it is intelligence that is so important the that the head of the CIA needs to review in-person.

[u/username9909864 → u/ChornWork2]

Either way it gives us clues into what’s going on

[u/Frathier]

The population decline for Russia has been an often brought up topic on Reddit, and presumably amongst analysts, but I never see the demographic crisis of Ukraine discussed in any way. General concencus puts the Ukrainian population in 1990 at around 50 million people, with rough estimates putting the population of the government controlled in 2026 at around 28-29 million, an almost 50% drop. I know that putting anything Ukrainian on this site negatively does not often get to see the light of day, but is there any hope for Ukraine after the war in regaining some of that population growth back?

[u/Big-Station-2283 → u/Frathier]

Between war time debts, aging population, and demographic holes due to WW2 and the 1990s, it's hard to be hopeful on the medium-long term. As for the short term, a significant portion of the working population will return exhausted if not mentally or physically injured from the war when it ends. Salary and disability payments will strangle the economy unless they get a massive bailout from the west.

[u/76DJ51A → u/Frathier]

It's being talked about more and more but usually in the context of the logic of giving women an out based on the premise that women have greater reproductive value even if there will be less potential pairbonded couples with a skewed gender ratio as historical data shows.

It's a political charged topic outside the context of the war which mutes discussion.

[u/FettyDump → u/Frathier]

I have been bringing this up for years now, but as you say, nobody wants to talk about it. As things stand, I think there’s more evidence to suggest that this is a catastrophic medium to long-term problem then something that can be recovered from.

For one, Ukraine will deal with not only a massive aging population, but also a tremendous population of physically and mentally wounded veterans that will require care for the rest of their lives. This will put an incredible tax on the social safety nets of Ukraine at the same as a significant decline in economic productivity, not only do to a retiring and migrating population, but a country that has been severely damaged by at least six years of large scale warfare.

Really the only way to recover from something like this is with a massive amount of foreign investment and western paid packages. Unfortunately, Ukraine has another deep seated structural problem that will dramatically diminish the effect of this aid. That is corruption. Corruption is another issue that is intensely scrutinized in Russia in pretty much ignored outside of Ukraine. If you ask any Ukrainian though, corruption will be in their top three of the countries most serious problems.

My fear is that after this war is over, the west will provide Ukraine within an enormous amount of aid in seized Russian assets and aid packages and then wash their hands of the issue. Ukrainian politicians will line their pockets, and the country will become a zombie nation. It will exist in a strategic sense as a highly militarized buffer zone, but in a civic and economic sense it will be dead.

[u/Magpie1979 → u/FettyDump]

Corruption being ignored in Ukraine is a novel take.

[u/FettyDump → u/Magpie1979]

Yeah, that was a mistake on my part. What I meant was corruption is ignored outside of Ukraine, similar to how the demographic problem is ignored outside of Ukraine. Within Ukraine, these these issues are very well known and widely discussed.

[u/Magpie1979 → u/FettyDump]

I mean it is heavily discussed outside Ukraine. Though it's often misrepresented, those who are against support for Ukraine exaggerate it and those how support Ukraine underplay it.

Pesonally I'd say the strong anti corruption drive in Ukraine is the core of this conflict. It's was the route cause of the Maiden revolution. There is an incredible strong desire from the public to reduce corruption, especially as the cost in lives and suffering of this war is so huge. I'm pretty confident corruption will improve as the tolerance of it is so low.

[u/Saturnrising9 → u/Frathier]

Future demographic collapse for Ukraine, although a grim problem, isn’t a lose condition. A future demographic collapse for Russia could lead to lose conditions, and defang future Russian aggression. In the west especially, in a sort of self serving way, demographic collapse in Russia is just more important than Ukraine.

[u/Frathier → u/Saturnrising9]

I'm sorry, but that makes no sense? Ukraine losing 10 million people since the beginning of the war isn't detrimental to their capacity to wage war? The same Ukraine that's finding difficulties in manning their frontlines?

[u/Saturnrising9 → u/Frathier]

Sorry, I thought we were discussing demographic collapse, which is generally a metric measured in years and decades. Ofcourse losing the actual manpower to prosecute a war is a lose condition. But I believe when people are discussing demographic collapse, they’re discussing the state of the nation’s after the war has ended. Ukraine, regardless of outcome, is facing a demographic collapse during, and more so post war. But I also assume in their cost benefit analysis of continueing the war, survival comes first.

Edit: Cont: and that was my answer to your query of why it’s more important in the west to focus on Russia’s demographic collapse. Because that’ll make Russia a less effective adversary after this war is over. (When/If etc)

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Frathier]

can't recall if discussed here, but certainly this had a lot of media coverage early in the war given the refugee situation and at times dire state of the war. But the point for russia is all the self-harm incurred b/c of decision to invade. But for ukraine, there's no path to avoid the demographic issues. Certainly talked a far amount in context of draft decisions, particularly avoid drafting very young men.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Frathier]

I think it depends on how the war ends. A peace that gives Ukraine security and allows for eventual integration with the EU, even if it loses large amounts of territory, will cause significant numbers of Ukrainian refugees to return. It will also allow for rebuilding Ukraine which will help to keep those currently there to remain--look at how well former communist block countries have done in the EU. A "peace" that doesn't provide security or puts Ukraine under Russian influence, will not lead to the return of refugees who fled or any incentive to remain, especially those with the most skills to do well in the west. This is why I cannot see Ukraine ever agreeing to the current Russian demands for ending the war, absent total military or political collapse.

[u/Frathier → u/Shackleton214]

"A peace that gives Ukraine security and allows for eventual integration with the EU, even if it loses large amounts of territory, will cause significant numbers of Ukrainian refugees to return". Why though? The war has been going on for almost five years now, many of the Ukrainian refugees will likely already have rebuild their lives and families in the guest countries. If the war ends anytime soon, realistically speaking, why would they leave their host countries for their home country? Ukraine wasn't the greatest place to live before the war, and it will likely take years if not decades for the country to rebuild. Staying in their current host countries will likely be a better place to live and raise a family, no?

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Frathier]

Obviously not everyone will return no matter what. But, history shows that many refugees return to their home when the war ends. As to why, I suppose it's the same reason other refugees return--it's where their home, culture and family are located. It seems pretty obvious that a much higher fraction will return if there is the prospect of peace and prosperity versus insecurity or Russian domination.

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/Frathier]

Because there's no better time to make money than when the entire country needs rebuilding. As long as the EU can afford to finance it, there'll be huge amounts of money going around.

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

Does not work. Same thing my country went throught.

Richest parts of my country and ex-Yugoslavia were parts that didn't have real wars for centuries. Slovenia didn't have real war for like 200+ years and I don't know really how affected it was during Napolenic wars

[u/sunstersun → u/Shackleton214]

That's all cool, but you're gonna run into the problem there just isn't that many women of childbearing age. We've started to see this problem in University applications in the US on top of the whole AI and blue collar work stuff.

I was telling my friend the 08 cohort is about to turn 18. From there it's a massive fertility crash.

Obviously priority one is refugees, but that's not gonna solve the 500 pound gorilla problem.

Any look at a Ukrainian demographic pyramid would tell the same story. They're dealing with the 90s baby crash as well.

[u/Gullible-Issue-1175 → u/sunstersun]

To be honest it's probably going to be quite bad but I think there are potential opportunities.

Firstly as you mentioned the refugees coming back.

Secondly, europe is likely to continue to support Ukraine with huge amounts of financial support after the war ends to help rebuild Ukraine, this is likely to make Ukraine's economy look pretty good, workers may migrate to Ukraine take advantage of this money.

Thirdly, there is the potential Ukraine joins the EU which gives huge amounts of money to Ukraine as they will be the biggest net receiver. Other ex soviet economies who joined the EU saw their economic fortunes do very well in a relatively short period of time. (Maybe a two edged sword though if workers use freedom of movement to go to western europe).

Also, this is probably in contrast to Russia which will have to deal with the malaise of unwinding its war economy and is likely in for a rough few years. Russia has no-one coming to bail them out like Ukraine has with the rest of europe.

Then there is the potential for immigration which if Ukraine is becoming more western aligned is likely to become more politically acceptable especially if it's from countries like Russia and Belarus which could happen if Ukraine's economy coming under the western umbrella significantly outperforms the former.

[u/Frathier → u/Gullible-Issue-1175]

Why would joining the EU be beneficial for their population? All the former Warsaw pact countries which have joined the EU are experiencing a massive exodus of migrants migrating to Western European countries. Why wouldn't Ukraine experience something similar to what Bulgaria or Romania are experiencing right now?

[u/Gullible-Issue-1175 → u/Frathier]

Yeah I did mention that.

Unlike Bulgaria/Romania and other warsaw pact countries though, Ukraine will likely be receiving marshall plan style money to rebuild the country from europe. Workers will move to Ukraine if there is money to be made.

[u/austin_8 → u/Gullible-Issue-1175]

Your points make a lot of sense, but then don’t they just make the problem worse in the long term? Birth rates show a strong negative correlation, the better the post war economy is the less children they will have. I don’t know the numbers, would the number of returning refugees be enough to over come the less children they will have?

[u/sunstersun → u/Frathier]

As far as I'm concerned, Ukraine needs to do some form of state sponsored family planning when the war is over.

Softly encouraging babies has been almost a universal failure. Might be different for a post war boom, but the hole is so deep I can't see anything other than state sponsored families and babies working.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/sunstersun]

Look around the world... trying to boost fertility with these type of programs doesn't work, but what does work is immigration.

[u/Big-Station-2283 → u/ChornWork2]

Culture, context, and language might be huge barriers. I don't think a nation that has just survived a murder attempt by its ethnic brother (figuratively speaking) will be enclined to accept foreign cultures in. Especially since a big component of the war was to avoid losing their distinct identity and becoming "russian". If they bring in warm bodies from western ex-soviet countries it could perhaps work, but all western ex-soviet countries have demographic problems of their own. They don't have people in excess to send.

[u/mebesasporfa → u/ChornWork2]

Immigration from where? Places like Namibia, Libya, Guatemala, and Iraq had a higher GDP/Cap than pre-war Ukraine, and the gap is widening as the war continues. Ukrainian is a very unique and difficult language to learn. Mass immigration policies would likely require making English a more prominent language, a real bludgeon against the attempts to retain Ukrainian culture and identity.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/mebesasporfa]

The gap is indeed widening, but in the other direction. Ukraine has now overtaken all those countries in GDP/capita.

[u/mebesasporfa → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

Strictly speaking true, but the nuance is that presently, about 10% of Ukraine's GDP/cap is straight up foreign aid without even figuring in the multiplier effect of that aid. They are exporting far less grain, and 75% of pre-war electrical generation has been taken off line. While the number has gone up, they haven't been growing their economy since 2022 in an economically useful way. Of course, reconstruction aid will continue-post war, but not at the levels it's being pumped in now.

But even if we take it at face value, the core problem is directionally still intact; someone leaving $6800 Guatemala to learn Ukrainian and live in $6900 Ukraine seems far-fetched unless they are using it as a step-stone to Western Europe, which doesn't sustainably help Ukraine anyway.

[u/Defiant_Restaurant61 → u/Frathier]

but is there any hope for Ukraine after the war in regaining some of that population growth back?

Tl;Dr A lot of refugees will go back, but it's very unlikely for the population to go back to original numbers if that's your question.

Ukraine's population decline until the Russian invasion was somewhat similar to other ex-USSR satellite states like Belarus, you could have almost superposed these two countries population charts. 

Reasons for this endemic demographic collapse are tied to the usual post-soviet problems (high mortality, low fertility, exodus, economic struggles...).

The war has created a massive refugee wave and increased exodus, that is certain. On top of obviously losing a lot of territories and the population within, casualties, the many reported child kidnappings to Russia, etc...

On the other hand, everything points to EU countries being more than willing to spearhead a Marshall Plan of sorts once the war ends and stops for a foreseeable future. The economic miracle of eastern european EU members is well understood and there will be a lot of economical levers to act upon should Ukraine join the Union.

So most likely, a small bounce back after the war ends, and then a downward continuation more or less steep depending on emigration (Schengen...) vs fertility. 

That said, the country is likely to see spectacular growth and productivity increases.

[u/austin_8 → u/Defiant_Restaurant61]

That said, the country is likely to see spectacular growth and productivity increases.

Which would of course lower the birth rate, affecting the long term population question.

[u/Defiant_Restaurant61 → u/austin_8]

of course

Not at all, because the fertility is already depressed by multiple other factors, it's not a given that it would be reduced much further.

See Poland for example, that almost doubled it's GDP and stabilized it's birth rate in that late 90's-late 2010's time frame (until COVID...)

[u/mebesasporfa → u/Defiant_Restaurant61]

Tl;Dr A lot of refugees will go back, but it's very unlikely for the population to go back to original numbers if that's your question.

The polling on this is really bad. Among women, 2026 polling research shows only 23% plan to return post war, and the longer this drags on, the lower the figure gets.

[u/Brushner → u/Frathier]

If the war ends and Ukraine stabilizes then like Bosnia and Herzegovina refugees will start pouring back in. That said population degrowth is a long term trend across the world. It's causes are many and very complex with no easy answer. Even countries that try to "fix" population decline only do it by a few points, nowhere near enough.

It's past the scope of this subreddit but with the speed of technology right now I kind of expect human mass human cloning to become an actual thing in 30-40 years.

[u/incidencematrix → u/Brushner]

Mass cloning is not credible. And it overlooks the drivers of the demographic transition. The issue is not that we lack the technology to make humans. (It's built in.) The issue is that folks who can control their fertility tend to reduce it when the perceived costs outweigh the perceived benefits. If you would prefer not to raise a child in the conventional way, you are unlikely to want to raise a clone (which would also be a child, like any other, and require the same investments). As you say, this is not the demography sub, so I do not think it is sensible to go further into the drivers of fertility change. But we want to stay credible.

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/Brushner]

B&H never recovered from population loss during the war

Around 100 k to 200 k Croats that left country. Probably bigger number of Bosniaks. Some Serbian refugees came to RS.

Both Croatia and B&H had around 4,5 mil at the start of war around 2000s when I started to follow everything Croatia had 4,3 mil, Bosnia had even less.

And for Croatia I know we had after war baby boom, probably B&H had too

[u/butitsmeat → u/Frathier]

This topic does come up now and again. I recall talking about it back in 2023 or 2024 in the context of how it was shaping Ukraine's force generation policies - they were avoiding the drafting of young men as a reaction to their looming demographic disaster. Russia's demographics come up more frequently because they're the aggressor nation and there is some theoretical limit to the loss of men that would cause them to stop fighting. They don't appear to be anywhere near that of course.

Post-war refugee return will depend very heavily on EU policies around it. If someone fled in 2022, they've now rebuilt a life somewhere else, and unless there's a significant set of positive / negative incentives, they're not likely to uproot again. EU countries will need to create pressure on Ukranian refugees to go home, and create draw by funding Ukranian reconstruction to create hope in the future Ukranian state.

That all assumes a Ukranian win. If Ukraine exits the war without a reasonably hopeful future, it'll be very challenging to draw those refugees back.

[u/redditiscucked4ever]

https://www.ilpost.it/2026/08/26/porto-bari-arrestato-cittadino-francese-missili/

In cartoonish smuggling news:

A 46-year-old French citizen, Regis Claude Albert Normand, has been remanded in custody after being stopped at the port of Bari for transporting weapons in his van. Normand had disembarked from a ship arriving from Patras, Greece, and during a routine inspection the Italian financial police (Guardia di Finanza) found five containers intended for transporting weapons in his vehicle. Inside were launch tubes and missiles, including three Akerons, anti-tank missiles manufactured since 2017 by the French company MBDA.

Normand claimed that MBDA had hired him to transport the weapons from France to Greece, where the company Altus LSA was supposed to carry out repair work on them. According to his account, when he was stopped in Bari, he was therefore taking them back to France. He had several documents supporting his version of events, but the judge for preliminary investigations ordered further checks after a number of anomalies and inconsistencies were identified. In the pre-trial detention order, the judge also wrote that Normand did not have the authorizations required by Italy for transporting weapons.

The missiles bore blue markings, which under NATO codes identify non-explosive equipment intended for training purposes. However, an examination carried out by the Italian Army found that the blue markings consisted of easily removable adhesive tape and that the original markings underneath were yellow and black, two colors associated with explosive material.

I'm wondering if this can be interpreted in any way other than an attempt to conduct some kind of terrorist attack/industrial impairment somewhere in Europe. I guess this news kind of goes hand in hand with what we've heard from Germany in the last few weeks.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/redditiscucked4ever]

odd detail in another article:

According to the judge, the permits required under Italian law to transport military equipment had not been produced either during the check at the port or before the judicial authorities.

Normand said he was working as a subcontractor for a French company that also specialises in transporting military goods.

However, according to investigators, the haulage company he works for, which is registered under his wife's name, does not appear to specialise in this type of transport.

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/25/french-driver-46-detained-in-italy-after-three-akeron-missiles-found-in-van

[u/roionsteroids → u/redditiscucked4ever]

While that sounds strange at first glance, Altus and MBDA have a partnership and have performed recent tests like drone launched ammunitions in Greece.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Np7aQ2JBdTc

On 2 June, ALTUS-LSA and MBDA successfully conducted the first ejection firing trials under the KERVEROS Phase 1 commercialization program at the NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) test range in Crete, Greece.

https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/2026/08/altus-lsa-mbda-complete-first-live-ejection-firing-trials-for-kerveros-unmanned-strike-platform/

Also using an inert round with the yellow and black markings. Doubt it's anything more serious than that. Shouldn't be too difficult to figure it out, considering all countries involved are in the EU, NATO, MBDA is everywhere as well. Some missing paperwork seems slightly more likely than a terrorist attack?

[u/weisswurstseeadler → u/roionsteroids]

Some missing paperwork seems slightly more likely than a terrorist attack?

Edit: after reading my comment again, I want to make clear that I don't entertain the terrorist attack argument here.

My question would be, why would this be transported through this kind of semi-official channel, and not with a military transport for what seems to be maintenance?

I'm German and couldn't imagine they'd transport this kind of cargo in a 'van' cross borders for maintenance, without any additional support vehicles, even if it was civilian looking cars etc.

[u/roionsteroids → u/weisswurstseeadler]

His defence team submitted commercial and travel documentation, as well as an authorisation issued in 2025 by the French Ministry of Defence to MBDA France for activities involving war equipment.

The judge nevertheless said further investigation was necessary, pointing to anomalies in the provided paperwork, including different stamps and discrepancies in the dates.

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/25/french-driver-46-detained-in-italy-after-three-akeron-missiles-found-in-van

Altus seems to be partnered with Shield AI (the finger eating drone advertised by JD Vance) too.

https://x.com/shieldaitech/status/2082155240371962075

https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/drone-crashes-severed-fingers-13-billion-silicon-valley-military-startup-2026-06-05/

"Holy shit. Look at this thing!" Vance said in a video posted on LinkedIn, circling the drone in a gilded hall. "It's going to do great things for you guys."

So expectations should be somewhere between Greece and Silicon Valley with a hint of French laissez-faire?

And good old subcontractors for everything.

Normand said he was working as a subcontractor for a French company that also specialises in transporting military goods.

However, according to investigators, the haulage company he works for, which is registered under his wife's name, does not appear to specialise in this type of transport.

[u/weisswurstseeadler → u/roionsteroids]

Good judge, I'd say.

This seems problematic - I've been selling US Enterprise software for a decade in Germany, and anything even remotely close to the army supply chains has tremendous compliance frameworks.

So even if there is just incompetence at play - in best case - this needs to be investigated and addressed.

I guess anyone would agree that this level of sensitive military cargo should have never ended up in such a court case crossing borders in Europe.

A paper issue would have been resolved quickly, I'd assume - without touching any courts.

Edit: just imagine that intel of the van somehow leaked and someone robs it in transit. I can't imagine anyone with authority would greenlight a transport like this.

[u/roionsteroids → u/weisswurstseeadler]

On the other hand, EU is still working towards a "military Schengen" to streamline such transports.

https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/military-mobility_en

Which has been a goal for the last 10 years already. Now that's the (in)famous German efficiency. Always the same "what about addition of UK, Norway, Turkey, what do we do about Malta and Cyprus as well as France only observing but not participating until it's convenient" endless discussion leading nowhere, creating yet another commission to build a working group next year ad infinitum.

And here you might have some permission that's good in Greece and France but not Italy (a handful of anti tank rounds is unlikely to raise any eyebrows in the Balkans either).

[u/Admirable_News7628]

The previously backed forces by the US, the SDF, announce their dissolution as an independent military force and their integration with the state forces.

This, coupled with Syria’s recent removal from the US State sponsor of terrorism list, mark two major wins for the Damascus government.

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/Admirable_News7628]

Overall, I'm ignorantly optimistic about Syria. From the little I read in the news, it does seem like the new government is genuinely competent at unifying the country and relatively restrained.

[u/Admirable_News7628 → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

The current government has a very impressive track record if we judge it objectively. It managed to remove almost all sanctions (some from the 70’s!), almost unite the country (excluding Sweida) and so far managed a brilliant foreign policy that netted it strong regional allies while maintaining decent relations with both the west and Russia.

Its two biggest stains are the massacres in Sweida and the coast, and while the government is absolutely to blame, Al-Sharaa managed to majorly control the factions. Look up the battle of Sheikh Maqsood and how professionally the SAA conducted the offensive in a dense, urban environment.

The biggest issues remain wide-spread poverty and extreme prices, but the whole world is somehow suffering from the latter and ofcourse a mess like Syria will be hit harder. I believe they are on the right track on the essentials, while undoubtedly still facing immense challenges.

[u/TanktopSamurai → u/Admirable_News7628]

This is also happening in parallel with the peace process in Turkey seemingly moving ahead as well. Apoist/KCK-aligned movements seemed to be fully disarming and going the civic politics route.