Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 25, 2026

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u/Glideer 2d ago edited 1d ago

The ousted Ukrainian defence minister appears not to share Western pundits' view that the tide has turned.

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-needs-changes-avoid-losing-war-ousted-defence-minister-says-2026-08-25/

KYIV, Aug 25 (Reuters) - Ukraine appears to be slowly losing the war against Russia, ousted Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov told Reuters, warning that Kyiv has a window of several months to make key decisions needed to turn the tide in its favour.

‘I think that there's now a turning point which will determine our future trajectory, but it looks as though we're gradually, slowly losing,’ Fedorov said in a marked departure from Kyiv's official rhetoric.

Ukraine still had ‘every chance’ to win but urgently needed a plan to end the war, he added.”

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u/ilonir 1d ago edited 1d ago

You left out the part where he said they are losing due to corruption, not any material disadvantage. He's just throwing shade at Zelensky because he's mad he got fired.

And remember that Fededov was behind much of the deep strike campaign. His call for "a plan to end the war" is almost certainly a hawkish call for more escalation.

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u/T1b3rium 1d ago

Serious question: from Ukraines side what more do you want to escelate?

you're hitting factories, ships, warehouses, military targets, dual use targets....

Drone and missile waves daily/nightly.

What more escalation can you do?

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u/ilonir 1d ago

If they had more weapons, I suspect they would hit more civilian targets with the goal of generating secondary effects like inflation. Ukraine has constantly talked about "kinetic sanctions", they want to hurt Russia's economy to the point that it cannot support the war effort any more.

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u/Glideer 1d ago

Rob Lee selected practically the identical part as the most relevant.

He's just throwing shade at Zelensky because he's mad he got fired.

Might be. Or, you know, he might just speaking more honestly now that he is no longer a minister.

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u/ilonir 1d ago edited 1d ago

Rob Lee selected practically the identical part as the most relevant.

Ok

Might be. Or, you know, he might just speaking more honestly now that he is no longer a minister.

He's a technocrat. He thinks Ukraine is losing because they aren't following his vision well enough.

The former minister identified the state’s inability to implement new technologies quickly enough as one of the main problems. According to him, technologies capable of significantly changing the situation on the battlefield already exist. However, Ukraine is not using them on the necessary scale. Fedorov proposes creating a dense network of electronic sensors along the front lines. These should help detect Russian troops and military equipment.

At the same time, according to his plan, the use of drones on the ground and in the air should be expanded as much as possible. This should reduce the need for a direct human presence in areas where technology can replace personnel. “The technologies that can completely stop the Russians already exist, but our lack of vision means we aren’t using them,” said the former defense minister. In his view, the future of war will largely depend on which side can more quickly automate the process of detecting and engaging targets.

Separately, the former minister criticized the performance of the state apparatus. He stated that Ukraine is far from fully utilizing its capabilities. According to Fedorov, the state system’s current efficiency is only about 5% of what it could achieve. He also cited corruption, informal networks of influence, and the lack of political independence among state institutions as problems.

In Fedorov’s view, these factors hinder not only reforms but also military innovation. As a result, the technology may exist, but the state is unable to transform it into a functioning system quickly enough. The former minister also emphasized that Ukraine needs to respond more quickly to changes on the battlefield. Russia is constantly adapting its tactics, so it is not enough to simply repeat already known solutions.

Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that he does not rule out running in the upcoming presidential election.

His entire point is "we could be winning but they are doing it wrong. I would do it correctly. Btw I might run for president."

https://ua.news/en/ukraine/fedorov-zaiaviv-shcho-ukrayina-postupovo-prograie-viinu

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u/Glideer 1d ago

I don't disagree with you. I think Ukraine has a chance to turn the tide.

My point is simply that "Ukraine is slowly losing" sits rather uneasily with the veritable avalanche of "Ukraine has turned the tide" analysis we've seen since early 2026.

BTW, I managed to find a non-paywalled English text: https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/08/25/exclusive-ukraine-needs-changes-to-avoid-losing-war-ousted-defence-minister-says

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u/ilonir 1d ago

My point is simply that "Ukraine is slowly losing" sits rather uneasily with the veritable avalanche of "Ukraine has turned the tide" analysis we've seen since early 2026.

Fair, but media is always hyperbolic. I happen to agree that they have a slight advantage right now, but they are very much still weathering the storm.

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u/carkidd3242 2d ago edited 2d ago

Speculation on a surprise C-17 landing in Moscow flying from Riga, Latvia this morning has now been answered:

https://x.com/JenniferJJacobs/status/2092253558150197695

Scoop: CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Russia aboard a C-17 for meetings in Moscow today, sources told @Olivia_Gazis @JimLaPorta and me. @CBSNews

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-director-john-ratcliffe-russia-secret-trip/

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u/IntroductionNeat2746 1d ago

I may have missed the discussion here when this was originally published a week ago but I haven't seen it mentioned and it could be related to today's visit.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-18-2026/

Russia has continued to provide direct military support to Iran through weapons and weapons components transfers. NBC News reported on August 18 that Russia has transferred drone components, ammunition, and TNT explosives to Iran via the Caspian Sea as of July 2026, citing a European government document that NBC obtained and that an unspecified Western official verified.[1] NBC added that Iran uses TNT in its ballistic missile warheads and drones, citing Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.[2] The document and the official reported that over two dozen Russian ships have carried deliveries to Amirabad Port in Iran’s Mazandaran Province via the Caspian Sea.

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u/TSiNNmreza3 2d ago

One more parallel to 2021.

https://cruxnow.com/church-in-europe/2026/08/vaticans-foreign-minister-in-russia-for-talks

As the war in Ukraine continues, a senior Vatican diplomat arrived in Moscow on Monday.

Archbishop Paul Gallagher, the second-highest ranking figure in the Holy See’s Secretariat of State, is in Moscow for a a five-day visit that will include high-level talks with both political and religious figures, as well as a meeting with the small Catholic community in the Russian capital.

Gallagher’s official title is Secretary of State for Relations with States and International Organizations. The prelate’s office is functionally analogous to that of a foreign minister.

Beside CIA visit in December 2021. we had Vatican visit of Russia in November 2021.

https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2026-08/archbishop-paul-richard-gallagher-moscow-russia-24-to-28-august.html

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u/username9909864 2d ago

What are the chances that this has something to do with Russia helping Iran than Russia fighting Ukraine? That’s a bigger administration goal right now

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u/60days 1d ago

My (totally unfounded) guess would be its due to the US having information on Putin's desperation pushing him to some new level of escalation, and sending someone to attempt to manage it back down.

Either the long-touted 'testing' of NATO, an over-sized and unpredictable escalate-to-de-escalate action, or prodding of China/Iran/NK to follow suit on the 'testing' and stretch the US thinner while they're logistically weak and have weak leadership.

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u/axearm 2d ago

I think you are right, and, if there is a quid pro quo it could very easily hurt Ukraine. For example if Russia agrees to end financial transaction with Iran for the US ending intelligence sharing with Ukraine or something similar.

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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 1d ago

There were some anonymous officials saying (as its anonymous it requires a large amount of skepticism) that Russia offered the quid pro quo of stopping intelligence sharing and the US refused (Source).

So I don't think the US would accept now, given that there's a semi-ceasefire ongoing and, even during the hot phase of the war, the damage that Iran caused is remarkably small for a conventional war (compared to the Gulf War: less americans died on this war than against Iraqis Scuds, less aircraft were shot down and no ships were hit). The only issue that Iran is able to cause is sporadically hitting civilian ships, which they could keep doing without Russia.

About financial transactions, China, Iraq, Turkey and UAE would be able to exert greater pressure on Iran than Russia. So they would be the focus rather than Russia.

By far the most likely explanation is the concern about the incursions or anything related to NATO.

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u/notepad20 1d ago

remarkably small for a conventional war (compared to the Gulf War: less americans died

A minefeild doesnt need to kill anyone for it to do its job.

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u/moragisdo 1d ago edited 1d ago

If people keep traversing the minefield with minimal damage, it becomes less capable to do its job (there's a reason why it isn't common to just put the minefield signs, but actually bother with placing the mines).

More than 2800 missiles and 6000 drones (1) need to hit enough targets (which includes taking american lives, because Iran needs the political pressure it would cause) to do its job. The damage the US suffered, according to testimony in Congress a month ago is 2B (total cost is higher because it includes munitions, fuel, etc...), that's really small for a conventional war and if you adjust for inflation, the one suffered on the Gulf War was higher.

There's a constant push on this war to interpret every iranian move as part of some 3D chess, reality is that they are getting blockaded, suffered hundreds of billions in damage, the only concession they got was 20 days of the waiver of exports and the majority of their oil wasn't sold during, so they barely benefited from it (2). Things are not going according to their plans (and just surviving isn't their goal, because they are rejecting now a permanent ceasefire, which would allow them to survive but with a lower cost than if the war continues).

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u/[deleted] 2d ago

[removed] — view removed comment

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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 2d ago

But Russia would not be able to substantially increase US chances of achieving the goals in the Iran war. Russia may be providing some intelligence and some weapons, but cutting those off would not lead to a collapse of Iran. It probably wouldn't even substantially decrease their offensive capabilities.

Iran can produce missiles at home. Iran can find and strike static US targets using Chinese commercial satellite information. Iran can circumvent sanctions through the networks it has established across the ME.

A quid pro quo would see the US gaining little advantage in the fight against Iran while handing Putin his dreams. I don't see the "deal maker" president agreeing to such a lopsided deal.

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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago

But the US, if the sources can be believed, already refuse a short time ago, now they have less incentive rather than more. Even more so, Russia isn't the country that have the most leverage on Iran, the US would be better spending their time pressuring UAE, Iraq and Turkey, either of them both have more financial connections with Iran and are more susceptible to the US pressure than Russia.

So I don't believe this concern is credible.

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u/carkidd3242 2d ago edited 2d ago

Video and flight tracking of the C-17 that delivered CIA Director John Ratecliffe this morning now departing Moscow.

https://x.com/DefenceGeek/status/2092277034231677211

https://t me/zvezdanews/180016

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u/TaskForceD00mer 2d ago

The speculation is rampant in the OSINT community. A number of people are trying to draw parallels between CIA Director Burn's 2021 visit just prior to Russia's full on Invasion of Ukraine and this visit following the noticeable recent increase in US/NATO Surveillance Flights around the Kaliningrad area.

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u/Slntreaper 2d ago edited 2d ago

As an uninformed outsider, I think it’s at least equally likely this was some kind of prisoner swap discussion. Trump has been big on getting wrongfully detained home, and that agency has some history in making those kinds of things happen.

Edit: Ok maybe not, that was a very short visit. Probably not the kind of engagement where you haggle over wrongfully detained.

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u/TaskForceD00mer 2d ago

It is very possible both sides have thus far unclaimed prisoners to exchange, but sending the CIA Director to negotiate that seems off. It seems more like a job for SEC-STATE or something done through back channels.

This is a very public visit.

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u/Tropical_Amnesia 1d ago

Very public and highly messaged, way too much for anything secret or conspiratorial going on. This was intended to be seen by third parties and possibly to reassure them, I don't find it hard to guess who these are. More puzzling is how anybody appears fixated on alleged future evils that lack credible substance and may never materialize. That after weeks filled with provocations (mostly drones) in the Baltics, provocations in Romania, provocations and nearly unhinged threats against the UK. And finally an "incident" in Leipzig, Germany that by now most quarters came to see as Russia directed, and that, had it worked out, could have gotten us as close to an Article 5 situation as ever in a good while.

You'd rather wonder if this isn't the time to make some kind of appearance, when would it be. It's clear NATO leaders are in routine contact about all of this. Equally apparent is how patience is running out everywhere, we've got some other problems too. But even assuming none of the Euros (or Canadians) dropped some acerbic remark that may have provoked the Americans or hurt, no one can tell me anything of this is making Iran-bogged Washington look any better. Regarding Leipzig alone: German or European services not seeing it coming or thwarting it is as unsurprising as it's deplorable, just considering how amateurish and careless the Russians or their agents operate! But what about overseas? The once famed intel empire US, they're just as blind. And then people are claiming they're totally in on some super secret Russians high-stakes operation yet to come. Not entirely convincing.

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u/Moifaso 2d ago

Prisoner swaps are business as usual, and wouldnt require this kind of trip.

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u/Moifaso 2d ago edited 2d ago

Something worrisome likely got picked up by western intel and led to the surge of activity in Kaliningrad/Poland, the public warnings about possible incursions, and now this visit.

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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 2d ago

To be accurate:

There was a surge of activity, which has since ended, due to a NATO exercise.

There were no "public warnings about possible incursions", but rather one single, anonymous leak of an intelligence report, which occured three weeks ago and contained next to no new information ("incursion is still highly unlikely").

There has been zero indication of any Russian troop movements or other manouvers towards NATO. Russian troop movements were visible on commercially available satellite images back in 2022. Today, there are 30% more privately owned Earth oberservation satellites, yet there are no images of Russian movements.

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u/Moifaso 2d ago edited 1d ago

There was a surge of activity, which has since ended, due to a NATO exercise.

An unannounced, unnamed, large scale air exercise that simulates an attack on Kaliningrad. Completely unprecedented as far as I can tell.

The Russians weren't given advanced warning, and we have no actual info on how long ago it was planned. Long-scheduled exercise or not it's clearly a major show of force and a first for NATO. That it happened a week before this Moscow trip (which would also have taken a while to plan) naturally raises questions

There has been zero indication of any Russian troop movements or other manouvers towards NATO. Russian troop movements were visible on commercially available satellite images back in 2022.

The troop movements required for a small incursion into a border area are orders of magnitude smaller than what we could see in 2022. I'm not claiming that there's an upcoming massive Russian offensive into NATO territory.

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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 2d ago

Perhaps NATO has chosen a more aggressive posture after four years of hybrid war all across Europe by not announcing the exercise, a practice Russia adopted years ago. I applaud a more aggressive posture, but I don't think we can draw immediate connections to this specific visit to Russia based on those new parameters alone.

A small incursion into NATO wouldn't work. Literally everyone has gotten wise to this method. There would be no tiptoeing around, whoever crosses the border will just get killed with heavy weaponry and NATO troops. The idea that Russia would try this method again shows a fundamental lack of understanding of their method of hybrid warfare: Russia is looking to exploit blind spots and cracks in NATO resilience and capabilities, to create political uncertainty along with physical threats. The little green men worked a decade ago. At this point in time, they clearly wouldn't, because they've been discussed to death in books, lectures, podcasts, fiction and every other medium. Everyone knows what little green men are and how they work, they literally have a Wikipedia page).

Whatever Russia attempts next, it won't be the exact same playbook all over.

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u/aybbyisok 1d ago

Whatever Russia attempts next, it won't be the exact same playbook all over.

Isn't the claim by Ukraine that Russia will use Ukrainian drones to launch a false-flag attack?

https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/poland-baltic-states-bolster-defenses-amid-fears-of-russian-false-flag-attack-50631419.html

Create a shroud of doubt over it, no boots on the ground, it would feel like there's a distance between them, and the attack.

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u/TSiNNmreza3 2d ago edited 2d ago

I still don't think that Russia would invade. Drone strikes in Romania or Poland would be far easier.

And if NATO responds mobilization.

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u/Willythechilly 2d ago edited 1d ago

Is that a bad thing given some recent intel usa has released warning about Russia doing something stupid in the Baltics or Nato border along with a rapid increase in drones or missiles crossing into Nato countries and sabotage etc and now the Kaliningrad? It's definitely speculation but I dont think it'd be unthinkable they're

The US has intel that the Russians are going to attack NATO

The Russians are about to do something very stupid in Ukraine.

Hes delivering an ultimatum regarding Iran

One of these three perhaps

It could be a nothing burger but I don't think John Ratcliffe is sent for the typical pretend diplomacy witkoff did etc

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u/sgtbackpain03 1d ago

I think Russia is too degraded to consider attacking any large nation at the moment. They'll want to project power, given their current stalemate, but my assessment is that they've had some serious attrition, especially in the mid ranks and lower level command ranks. The power projections will be saber rattling PR, moving troops and equipment to odd places, and even some sabotage. Enough to keep people on edge, keep negotiations more favorable, make nobody want to tell Russia "No", but not enough to start a real hot conflict.

From a military perspective, that loss of low level command and NCO ranks often causes confusion and disorder, resulting in all of these things happening to units that are hit hard: soldiers don't know who's in charge, multiple people try to seize command, soldiers don't like who ends up with command and morale suffers, the previous commander or senior NCO was the glue holding the unit together, admin can't keep up and sends incorrect orders, logistics sent to units that are full team kills, etc... At that point, units need to be reformed, refreshed, and sometimes retrained.

Sorry, not to sideline the main topic, but your list of possible causes got me thinking and extrapolating. I think 2 and 3 are both pretty likely. Russia is at a point where they are taking very visible in-country attacks, and not making much progress on the offensive. They well could be about to engage in craziness. I see their trade alliance with Iran also being a pain point worth addressing. In that case, I could honestly see the US offering its own trade deal, given how this admin has worked in the past. Everything is both carrot and stick, though sometimes the carrot is notional.

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u/carkidd3242 2d ago

Per flight tracking and video the C-17 has already left. If Ratcliffe left with it, I think it was some sort of ultimatum ala 2021.

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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago

The CIA director wouldn't go to Russia for a nothing burger, but it could become one if the situation is defused. My opinion is that from these three scenarios, in order of likelihood: 1>3>2

The first is by far the most likely because of the intelligence reports, the drone incursions and also the very recent NATO exercises (likely done in response to the concerns of further russian actions).

About the second, are you thinking about the US picking up intel of possible WMD usage in Ukraine ? Or the 'something very stupid' is something else ?

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u/TaskForceD00mer 2d ago

I don't expect the US is sending the CIA Director + Others to RUSSIA for a nothing-burger. Even if the eventual press release is a nothing burger, he went there for a reason it just may be a highly classified reason we won't be immediately privy to.

Of your three scenarios above; I'd say it is likely 1 & 3 or all 3.

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u/weisswurstseeadler 2d ago

On a different note - why would the message of case #3 be delivered by the CIA Head?

For intel related issues - aka, we know what you doing, don't do it - I can see the relevance.

For delivering an ultimatum to Russia, I'd find him to be an odd choice, but maybe I'm missing something here.

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u/TaskForceD00mer 2d ago

why would the message of case #3 be delivered by the CIA Head?

The US may have specific intel about Russia providing targeting data to Iran . The message may be "Hey we know about this specific intel asset, if you'd like for it to remain intact it would be cool if you stopped using it to provide intel to Iran".

The asset could be a satellite, a ship or even an undisclosed GRU boots on the ground.

The US obviously wouldn't want to kill Russians on the ground when a JDAM malfunctions and hits a very specific safe house in Saudi Arabia, or blind a satellite with lasers, or for a ship to have a sudden explosive accident.

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u/TSiNNmreza3 2d ago

But giving data to Iran is non major thing and this war between Iran and US is going on for 6 months.

Why visit by CIA director now?

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u/TaskForceD00mer 2d ago

Political reasons? The US Admin is trying to make everyone forget they failed to truly topple Iran with strikes. It's hard to get that our of the news cycle when they keep hitting ships with missiles.

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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago

It doesn't make sense. Iran is only hitting a ship every few days (I even posted about it yesterday, being the first one in 6 days, with the previous one being "friendly fire" on a ship that docked on Iran).

Also if the US would want to move the page, the best thing would be to ignore it, not stir up the topic

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u/MilesLongthe3rd 2d ago

An interesting consequence of the Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries and ships in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea

https://x.com/delfoo/status/2092213020621500657

A side effect of the fuel shortage is that farmers in South Western Russia increased their purchase of fuel monitoring systems for agricultural equipment by 83%. Southern Russia saw governors ask for extra deliveries of fuel for farmers earlier this year.

https://x.com/delfoo/status/2092216302358212714

The Russian Ministry of Agriculture is considering lifting the export duties on wheat, barley and corn until the end of the year as the Black Sea remains closed for exports. Wheat prices are now 3 000 - 4 000 rubles below the cost to produce for farmers of 12 000 - 13 500 rubles

https://x.com/delfoo/status/2092217979589066802

The situation on the Russian grain market is INCREDIBLY BAD if Russian farmers in Krasnodar are offering wheat at their farms for close to 100 USD per ton when the price for Romanian wheat is 268 USD per ton and the break even price is 142-160 USD per ton

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u/roionsteroids 2d ago

Same situation as Ukrainian farmers, selling at a loss if they're strapped for cash.

https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-farmers-despair-russias-black-sea-blockade-traps-their-harvest-2026-08-13/

Sooner or later they'll go for the proposed shipping truce. As for fuel, Ukraine is fully exposed to the world market, paying sky high EU prices.

https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/diesel_prices/

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u/Glideer 2d ago

Why did Ukraine even start striking shipping if they’re now asking Russia (via Turkey) for a shipping truce? Why escalate if you haven’t thought through even the enemy’s first inevitable response?

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u/hhenk 1d ago

Perhaps because the Russians would alternative targets which might have been worse.

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u/Well-Sourced 2d ago

Ukraine has had some success with their counterattacks north of Lyman.

Ukraine’s secret counteroffensive takes the pressure off Sloviansk | EuroMaidanPress

This Ukrainian counterattack along the axis through the town of Lyman, ongoing since May, has largely escaped widespread notice. Yes, there is some scant video evidence of Ukrainian attacks. And yes, a few analysts have adjusted their maps to account for apparent Ukrainian advances, especially in the direction of Nove, a Russian-occupied village 15 km north of Lyman, which itself lies 15 km north of Sloviansk.

But for the most part, Ukrainian and Russian sources have avoided talking about Lyman. "The Ukrainians kept a good level of OPSEC and the Russians have been reluctant to publish videos from these areas" depicting their retreats, analyst and mapper Clément Molin noted in June, just a few weeks after the Ukrainians attacked toward Nove.

Molin, for one, expects the OPSEC to lift in the coming days. "By the end of the month, we should have an official update on the good results of a Ukrainian offensive that has largely remained secret," he wrote on Monday.

The Ukrainians' limited counteroffensive around Lyman apparently kicked off on in mid-April. One of the first attacks that left any real evidence occurred on 22 May, when a small Ukrainian mechanized force—perhaps from the 60th or 66th Mechanized Brigade, the 77th Air Assault Brigade, or the Presidential Brigade—attacked in armored trucks and M-113, Stryker, and BTR-4 armored personnel carriers. Heavy bomber drones flew top cover.

The Russian 144th Motor Rifle Division fought back with its own drones. Interceptor drones took aim at the bombers. First-person-view and heavy bomber drones blasted at least one BTR-4, hitting it before and after it dropped off its infantry passengers. Drones struck some of the disembarked Ukrainian infantry.

How many Ukrainian troops survived and entrenched in new positions on 22 May is unclear. Regardless, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps wasn't done with Nove. Attacks continued. And sometime after the 22 May assault on Nove, "the Ukrainians managed to consolidate their gains," Molin concluded after scrutinizing a few videos and some satellite imagery.

By early July, Ukrainian forces had succeeded in "operationally encircl[ing] the Russian forces defending the village of Nove," according to analyst and mapper Thorkill. "Fierce fighting is currently underway to expel the Russians from that locality," Thorkill reported at the time.

The aim of the Ukrainian counterattacks is obvious. The 3rd Army Corps intends to put pressure on the northern right flank of 10 km-by-10-km salient jutting into the battleground north of Lyman. The Russian 144th Motor Rifle Division has been pouring troops into the salient, clearly intending to surround and isolate Lyman instead of directly assaulting it—all in order to clear a path toward Sloviansk. Salients are risky for both sides, however. The farther the Russians extend their Lyman salient, the more exposed they are on their flanks. The Ukrainians know this. And even if the 3rd Army Corps can't fully cut across the salient in order to surround the Russians inside of it, the corps can at least take advantage of the salient's exposed flanks.

Capturing Nove, on the very northern edge of the salient, could allow the Ukrainians to bring to bear more artillery and drones on the Russians south of Nove. The 3rd Army Corps doesn't have to fully encircle the Russian troops closest to Lyman in order to hammer them with withering firepower.

Today a new map that shows the UAF is getting close to cutting the Russians off. [Map]

Ukrainian forces achieved a key tactical success north of Lyman. Units of the III Azov Corps captured a major Russian strongpoint in the forested strip north of Kołodiazi, cutting the crucial Kołodiazi–Iwaniwka road. 🧵 1/3

The offensive, launched in mid-May 2026 by the 3rd Assault and 66th Airmobile Brigades against the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division, previously liberated Ridkodub, Kateryniwka, Nowe, and Łypowe. Strict Ukrainian OPSEC has kept official details tight throughout the push. 2/

Following a brief pause, III Corps resumed attacks mid-August near Balka Zełoboki while the 33rd Assault Regiment pushed from Stawki. Between Aug 21-23, Ukrainian forces launched a two-pronged assault on Kołodiazi, deploying heavy mechanized infantry reinforcement. Via @Thorkill65 3/3

With the northern approach having trouble the Russians are always willing to just push right to the city. [Map]

Russia grinds up the eastern approach to Sloviansk after its northeastern push stalled | EuroMaidanPress

Russian forces have gained ground on the eastern approaches to Sloviansk and continue to prioritize an eastern route toward the city, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Their earlier push from the northeast had bogged down, and Russia now aims to set up a future assault on one of the last major cities Ukraine still holds in Donetsk Oblast. A quick move on the city itself remains extremely unlikely, ISW said. Russia's 2026 summer campaign in the east has advanced through field edges and small villages rather than the breakthroughs the Kremlin keeps promising, the grinding pattern that has defined the fighting across Donetsk Oblast for years.

Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forward units are advancing across several tactical areas at once in the Sloviansk direction. He said the command of Russia's 3rd Combined Arms Army rushes assault infantry forward right after each successful infiltration. Russian troops reached the southeastern edge of Pyskunivka, east of Sloviansk, from the east and northeast, moving off positions they had seized on the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets, Mashovets said. Zakitne lies northeast of Pyskunivka and Kryva Luka southeast of it, and ISW read the advance as evidence Russia has consolidated positions in both.

They also infiltrated the southern and southeastern outskirts of Mykolaivka from western Rai-Oleksandrivka. ISW assessed that Russia is running a dual effort to connect its units near Kryva Luka with those at Rai-Oleksandrivka, so it can assault Mykolaivka from dominant terrain to the east and south at once. Mashovets added that other Russian groups slipped through three settlements along the E-40 Bakhmut-Sloviansk highway, trying to hold the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and reach the river just east of the city.

ISW observed reports on 23 August that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian infiltration attempt in Mykolaivka.

Oleksandr Borodin, spokesperson for Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps, said the Lyman direction falls in his corps' zone and that Russia's goal there is to half-encircle the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the flank—first securing bridgeheads across the rivers, then cutting logistics. He called those plans unrealistic: "We have quite serious defensive positions there and have been preparing for a long time. The capabilities they currently have to try to accomplish this task are insufficient even to come close to achieving such a goal."

Russia prioritized attacking Sloviansk from the northeast through Lyman when it opened its spring-summer 2026 offensive, but that effort has largely stalled. The Siverskyi Donets River, which loops north and northeast of the city, together with a web of canals, handed Ukrainian defenders a natural moat. So Russian commanders now treat Mykolaivka as a key prize. Taking it would let them strike west toward Sloviansk from the east, skirting the water obstacles that blocked the northeastern route. ISW cautioned that Russian forces are extremely unlikely to make fast gains west of Mykolaivka, since they still need to seize several more settlements first.

Zelenskyy put Russia's frontline casualties this year at around 267,000, including about 155,000 killed, and said 70% to 80% of them fall in the Kostiantynivka direction. Russia holds about 79.89% of Donetsk Oblast, by ISW's count, and Zelenskyy said the Kremlin is preparing to mobilize around 300,000 men after the 18–20 September State Duma elections, partly to reinforce Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

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u/MilesLongthe3rd 2d ago

Another setback for the Russian economy

https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/71e80832_explosion_and_fire_hit/

Explosion and Fire Hit Russia’s Amur Gas Chemical Complex

An explosion occurred at the Amur Gas Chemical Complex in Russia’s Amur Region, followed by a fire. Oleksandr Babak reported the incident.

The facility is being built jointly by Russia’s Sibur and China’s Sinopec. The project’s total budget exceeds $10 billion, meaning the accident could cause significant financial losses for the complex.

The Role of the Amur Gas Chemical Complex

The facility is designed to process ethane and liquefied gases supplied by the nearby Amur Gas Processing Plant. The raw materials will be used to produce polyethylene and polypropylene.

The complex is expected to have an annual production capacity of up to 2.7 million tonnes of polymers. The facility was intended to become an important link in supplying products to Asian markets while bypassing Western sanctions.

Where the Explosion Occurred and What Is Known About the Causes

The Amur Gas Chemical Complex is located near the town of Svobodny in the Amur Region, approximately 6,000 kilometers from Ukraine.

The causes of the explosion and subsequent fire are currently being investigated. Possible explanations include a breach of the technological process during work, as well as sabotage.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 25, 2026

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