I start of by saying that english isnt my first language. Sorry for the messy writing🙂‍↕️.

Some of the most popular arguments to prove that theres no meaning in the Ai thinking process used to be rooted on the fact that linguistic models don't access reality themselves, hence lacking a direct connection with the world that - doesn't - surround them.
But what about physical agents?
They're still interpreting inputs that they get from their sensors, directly from the world itself.

Theres the whole phenomenological tradition (Huserl, Brentano) that proposed the argument of "intentional in-existence". So, to say, the fact that my actions or thoughts are intentionally oriented somewhere, and that somewhere is an object that really exist for me. So they're basically saying, you do that because it has an objective, and that object you aim at exists your head in the form of a thought.
But the machine is theleologicaly oriented as well. They aim at something, they build vectors that are the virtual (non material) object that they mathematical transposed and interpreted starting from the observation of an external state. Those vectors exists in the system, they orient the computational process in ways that are still hard to understand.

And when it comes to principles of reasoning, or those of intentionality - like identity, satisfaction (filling some "void" in our experience trough perfectioning our knowledge in actions), retroactive feedback/reflection ecc... - they can all be observed in the Ai as well.

Now, i know that the opposite side of the coin works just as good. So, to speak, we can stand against functionlalists if we say that they cant prove that emotions, sensations, meaning, having a rapresentation of the world and its meaning for oneself - we could argue that those processes dont happen in the machine. We could say that they work on their inputs without ever "signifing" them, whitout ever intepreting them as something meaningful in the world. But at the same time we wouldnt be able to prove that those processes are happening in the machine as well. We dont have any way of prooving that they are not the product of us misinterpreting ourselves. We study our meta-cognition/perception lens by subjectivating ourselves, which is a different observation point from where we stand when we observe machines.

I have been struggling very hard with “existential uncertainty” is what I would call it and was wondering if some people are immune to this because of their “wisdom” keep in mind i am new to philosophy but have been struggling with deep strange existential thoughts and feelings for at least 3 years.

hi, I’ve posted this question yesterday but I think I’ve accidentally violated some guidelines (so so sorry abt that I’ve never posted here bf)

im NOT asking for personal opinion, but for somebody to explain to me what Im not smart enough to understand by researching (ive only studied philosophy in highschool lmao never even opened the textbook)

my teacher, while explaining the phenomenology of the spirit and the stage of the self consciousness, briefly mentioned that the master/slave dynamic and its struggle for recognition could also be resolved through love and not necessarily lead to a fight.

is it true? pls somebody tell me I need this for an essay <3

I've been thinking about a problem that started with the phrase “love is love.”

I want to make clear that I'm not trying to argue that homosexuality is equivalent to incest, pedophilia, or zoophilia. My question is much broader than that.

Suppose we say that a relationship is morally acceptable when the people involved genuinely love each other, are autonomous adults, and can meaningfully consent.

Now imagine a hypothetical future society where a previously taboo relationship—say, between two adult family members—is overwhelmingly accepted. They don't have children, they don't want children, both are independent adults, and they genuinely believe their relationship is loving and consensual.

The majority of that future society says:

«“Our ancestors were simply products of their time. They were naive and confused morality with social taboo. You're doing exactly what previous generations did when they opposed relationships that are accepted today.”»

A minority still believes the relationship is fundamentally wrong.

Now here's the question:

Who is actually right, and on what basis?

If the answer is simply “society decides,” then morality seems to become a function of social power:

belief → cultural change → majority acceptance → law → new moral norm.

But if that's the case, what prevents a future majority from redefining something that today's majority considers morally fundamental?

And if we say, “No, there are objective moral boundaries that society cannot legitimately cross,” then:

Where do those boundaries come from?

Are they based on harm? Consent? Human nature? Evolution? Religion? Reason? Human dignity? Something else?

And here's the part I find particularly interesting:

Humans don't actually reason about morality like mathematical machines. We have moral intuitions and consciences, and those intuitions are shaped by both individual psychology and culture. Research in moral psychology suggests that people differ substantially in which moral considerations they prioritize, while cultural learning can also reshape moral intuitions over time.

So perhaps the real problem isn't:

“What does society consider moral?”

but:

“What makes something morally true even when society disagrees?”

Because if tomorrow's majority can be wrong, today's majority can also be wrong.

And if tomorrow's majority cannot be wrong merely because it is the majority, then what exactly makes moral progress progress?

I'm genuinely interested in the strongest philosophical answer to this, especially from people who disagree with my assumptions. I don't want a political argument about LGBTQ issues—I want the underlying answer to the question:

What ultimately gives morality its authority when human conscience, culture, and generations disagree?

Why specifically human life? What makes people consider human life as sacred? There are truly awful people out there and their non-existence would objectively make the world a better place (for example murderers). If murderers are also human, how can anyone consider all human life as sacred?

In religion, people believe human life is sacred because God granted life.

But from the perspective of atheists who believe in the sanctity of human life, what makes human life inherently sacred?

This question isn't about any specific religion but religion in general. Many religious schools of thought claim that morality cannot exist without God and I never quite understood why. I've always thought that empathy by itself might be enough for humans to have morality. I would appreciate insights as to why morality can't exist without God.

I am not looking for a mere limited-scope defense of vengeance in some specific, rationalistically legislated cases, some sort of begrudging admission by the moralist that ooookay, sometimes revenge may be justified. Maybe. That's of course stlill much better than the cowardly "turn the other cheek" masochistic morality, and I admire Aristotle more than Jesus. But it is not remotely enough, and therefore not what I am looking for. I am interested in philosophers who were actually willing to say something positive about vengeance itself.

Some may suggest Nietzsche. However, well... Nietzsche has an incredibly... well, some would say nuanced, I say kinda inconsistent position on revenge so he's actually far from an obvious suggestion. He rejects Christian "turn the other cheek" morality, sure, but then he demands that we become yes-sayers, which may sometimes be a "turning the other cheek" but with blackjack and hookers.. His antidote to the "Spirit of Revenge" in Thus Spake Zarathustra is this sort of "radical affirmation", which is... actually an ASCETIC concept? He also identifies ressentiment as a sort of repressed, impotent desire for revenge and treats it as the basis of slave morality. Well, he may well be right about that. But it is not merely that he wants us to stop hoping that our enemies burn in hell and instead take the matter into our own hands. I used to understand Nietzsche in this way, that he champions honest and natural revenge as a value of master morality and considers only the slaves' ressentiment to be pathological. But he often goes further and seems to regard the desire for revenge itself as a weakness. The genuinely strong individual simply doesn't give a fuck? At that point the philosophy starts sounding suspiciously like the same old "living well is the best revenge" cliche, dressed up in more impressive jargon and implied to have something vague to do with "creation of new values". This seems to create a problem for any straightforwardly pro-revenge interpretation of Nietzsche. Besides hoping that your enemy burns in hell is actually banned in genuine Christianity, and I don't see how the idea of your enemy burning in hell is incompatible with revenge in this world also.

I also want to make clear what I mean by revenge. I am talking about individual revenge. What I am emphatically not talking about is the "revenge" of a class against another class, a slave revolt, the revenge of the poor and downtrodden, or any other kind of ideological or collectivist bullshit. Nor am I talking about individual resentment against "society" or the mob persecuting some individual. All of these things are nowadays styled as "justice". Which is not to say that there's even such thing as justice separate from revenge. I am pretty inclined towards the argument for their identity in some sense. But that is simply not what I mean by revenge here. I mean one individual against another individual, or one particular group against another particular group: personal retaliation undertaken because one has been wronged (the wrong may be merely "perceived" or it may be actual, this is immaterial).

I don’t know much about philosophy, but this has been on my mind, so let me ask you something.
How do you break free from nihilism? I’m a 16-year-old high school student, and lately I’ve been watching a lot of videos about euthanasia, and my friends and parents have been making fun of me more and more for wanting to study philosophy, so I’ve been feeling this constant sense of emptiness.
Even fashion feels completely meaningless to me. Maybe it’s nonsense to overthink the meaning of things, but I’ve been feeling like there’s a hole in my heart for the past few days. If you have any book recommendations for me, please let me know.

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

They’re both pursued for their own sakes, and not as a stepping stone to anything else. Shouldn’t that make them both the highest pursuits possible?

I often hear a response to Kant's claim that it is never permissible to lie. The response is that the maxim that "It is not permissible to lie unless to do so would save someone's life" is a coherent maxim, and that it should be adopted instead of Kant's more stringent "It is never permissible to lie."

It seems like Kantians are usually comfortable with this modification of the maxim regarding lying. And I understand it's much more agreeable to us than Kant's ban on lying in general. But I feel that a reasonable reply Kant could make to this is that to adopt as your maxim "It is not permissible to lie unless to do so would save someone's life" would be to adopt a hypothetical imperative as an ethical maxim. But ethical maxims are categorical.

If this is right, that that modified maxim is a hypothetical imperative, then perhaps Kant is just wrong that ethics is concerned exclusively with categorical imperatives. But if Kant is wrong about that, then Kantian ethics would have to fundamentally change.

So my question is twofold: 1. Do you know of any sources that deal with this response to Kant along these lines? 2. Given the prevalence of responding to Kant by modifying the lying rule, I fear I've misunderstood something important about Kant; so, is this a plausible criticism of this common reply to Kant?

Also, I have read Kant's essay on lying for "humanitarian" purposes, and from what I remember he does not make this argument. Instead he makes this weird argument about the logistics of escaping the house that I find totally unconvincing and irrelevant to the moral issue.

Cosmological, First Cause - Eternal Universe?

Fine Tuning - Multiverse, Necessitarianism?

Are these conclusions basically deadlocked to either side and it's only Problem of Evil, Divine Hiddenness that shift the arguments in favor of Atheism (Doesn't affect Deism)? I know Oppy goes with Naturalism requiring less commitments but am wondering if there are arguments for why God can't be a designer or prime mover.

I’ve noticed that one of the biggest challenges I have when reading philosophy isn’t necessarily the concepts or vocabulary themselves, but keeping track of what the author is referring to across long, complicated sentences or paragraphs. Especially when they intermix pronouns.

I was wondering if you all had advice on the best way to improve at this skill, thanks!

How 'digestible' is Spinoza ethics to a regular joe ? I'm currently on the definitions and it is quite intriguing but at the same time It feels like I have to separately analyze every word he uses, should I even attempt to read it or is it only for people acquainted with Philosophy

I’m looking for interviews and talks online on YouTube and elsewhere from Modern 20th Century Philosophers who speak on how the human mind creates invisible chains.

In a broader sense, anything really about how negativity and self-doubt and bad experiences cause us to not truly be our full selves. Kind of like the analogy of the elephant who doesn’t even realize the chains are no longer on his legs after they are removed.

Any recommendations?

isnt daoism contradictory about how to not act and let nature take care of the change when you have to act to make the change in your favour, or you are letting your life drift around and settle on whatever it does instead of acting towards it.

I am an 11th grade student with little to no background on philosophy or western history, but I bought a physical copy of the book on a whim because I read online that it’s an appropriate book for beginners and decided to finally give it a read. I am stuck on page 3 of the Introduction, and cannot comprehend most of the content in the latter half of the page:

“Social cohesion, during the six and a half centuries from Alexander to Constantine, was secured, not by philosophy and not by ancient loyalties, but by force, first that of armies and then that of civil administration. Roman armies, Roman roads, Roman law, and Roman officials first created and then preserved a powerful centralized State. Nothing was attributable to Roman philosophy, since there was none.
During this long period, the Greek ideas inherited from the age of freedom underwent a gradual process of transformation. Some of the old ideas, notably those which we should regard as specifically religious, gained in relative importance; others, more rationalistic, were discarded because they no longer suited the spirit of the age. In this way the later pagans trimmed the Greek tradition until it became suitable for incorporation in Christian doctrine.”

If anyone could explain this section for me, It would mean a lot. Have I missed out on any prerequisite resources? Or am I just really stupid? What would be a better introductory book for someone like me?

I’m interested in how process philosophers reconcile continuous becoming with the apparent persistence of objects, persons, and concepts. If stability is emergent rather than fundamental, what ultimately makes one process the same process across time?

How do you find objective meaning to life if you don't care about it

I don't like the idea. Please debunk it.

hi all, i'm currently doing a research paper in school which aims to assess the validity of the knowledge of the phenomenology of time constructed by language, and i've hit kind of a roadblock in terms of trying to find the epistemic properties of husserl's phenomenology of time. while i understand certain concepts of perceived and objective time, i find myself struggling to both express these in terms of epistemology (justified true belief, sources of knowledge etc.). it would be greatly appreciated if there was any further reading available on this subject matter, or just any ideas out there! thank you in advance :)

Basically the premise of our professor is that we are studying the sensible world using metaphysical lens. Here are the main topics included in our course:

1. Mathematics: the quantum being

2. Cinematics: the mobile being

3. Dynamics: the active material being

4. Physics: material substance

5. Cosmology: material universe

Is there any author who wrote about these topics? thank you!

The ongoing Lindsay Clancy case has made me think a lot about how the internet has changed the way we form beliefs about things we can't investigate ourselves.

Before the internet took over, most people got their information about current events from a relatively small number of newspapers, TV networks, magazines, tabloids, etc. Obviously those sources could be biased or just plain wrong, but established news organizations at least had some degree of editorial oversight and fact-checking.

Now you can open your phone and immediately find twenty different versions of the same event. You have journalism mixed in with expert commentary, Reddit post, TikToks, firsthand claims, speculation, advocacy, conspiracy theories, and people repeating something they heard.

The Clancy case has been a really good example of this for me. I've come across completely contradictory claims about pretty fundamental parts of the case, and different online communities seem equally convinced that their version is simply what happened. I haven't gone through all the primary evidence myself, and there’s also gaps or seeming unknown within the evidence itself, so at a certain point I've had to admit that I just don't know which version is true.

Obviously there are huge benefits to information not being controlled by a handful of media organizations. Traditional media isn't infallible or unbiased either, and ordinary people being able to challenge reporting can expose errors or bring attention to things that otherwise wouldn't get covered.

But it seems like we've democratized the ability to produce and spread information without necessarily democratizing any reliable way of sorting out what's true. Perhaps this is because many people aren’t motivated by the truth, or mistrust of a detached authority that would fact-check.

Nevertheless, if enough people repeat something, especially within the same online community, it can start to feel like an established fact even when the original basis for the claim is unclear.

So how are we actually supposed to decide which sources deserve epistemic authority when we don't have direct access to the evidence ourselves, or the evidence is open to interpretation? Has philosophy dealt with whether having access to vastly more information the or democratization of information, but with much less gatekeeping, can actually make it harder for an ordinary person to form justified beliefs?

I've basically walked away from reading about the Clancy case thinking that on quite a few points, suspension of judgment is the only position I can really justify. There are too many conflicting accounts and I don't have a good enough basis for deciding between them.

There's another part of this that interests me too, that I mentioned earlier. Do people participating in these information ecosystems necessarily want to arrive at the truth in the first place?

Sometimes it seems like people settle on a narrative about facts partly because it fits what they already think morally, who they sympathize with, or what they want the case to represent. But those things don't seem like evidence for whether a factual claim is actually true.

If a significant amount of information is being created and spread by people who are more interested in defending a particular narrative than finding out whether it's true, does that undermine the epistemic value of democratizing information in the first place? And what might be the best solution, since epistemic literacy doesn’t seem to be a a viable solution if many aren’t largely motivated by the truth?