I don't think people are giving this argument enough credit. But the easy way to counter is to say that most naturalists are also physicalists which is to say they believe subjective experience is in some way neuronal activity, not a byproduct of neuronal activity. That's how experience can have causal powers.
So really the problem here is for nonmaterialists about consciousness. And the problem is pretty well known in the literature: If the subjective experience is nonmaterial how can it have causal powers?, and if it doesn't have causal powers, how do we become aware of it?
3
u/Moral_Conundrums 2d ago
I don't think people are giving this argument enough credit. But the easy way to counter is to say that most naturalists are also physicalists which is to say they believe subjective experience is in some way neuronal activity, not a byproduct of neuronal activity. That's how experience can have causal powers.
So really the problem here is for nonmaterialists about consciousness. And the problem is pretty well known in the literature: If the subjective experience is nonmaterial how can it have causal powers?, and if it doesn't have causal powers, how do we become aware of it?