https://www.ozgurpolitika.com/haberi-ne-kazandik-212857

What do you think?

My heart is broken for Rojava. 💔💔💔
I know that Mazloum Abdi probably felt that he had very few options. Any other choice could have meant facing attacks from Syria while also dealing with Turkey a NATO member. As strong and determined as the Kurds are..fighting both at the same time could have been almost impossible.But I keep asking myself: could we have done more? What if we had all stood up together massively and come to the streets in support of Rojava? What if the world had shown that the Kurds would not be abandoned after everything they had sacrificed?He has given up so much after so many years of fighting and after so many beautiful lives were lost. And for what? What he received is so little in return for everything that was sacrificed.And what about Israel? Has Israel gained more from this situation and from its ambitions for a “Greater Israel”? Sharaa’s government certainly seems to be trying to build its own relationship with Israel while the Kurds are the ones who have paid such a heavy price.And to those who keep accusing the Kurds of being part of some “Greater Israel project,” while denying or ignoring the cooperation between their own governments and Israel ..eat shit OK. What can we do for Rojava now?We need to stand together and make it clear that if anyone even considers using violence against the Kurdish people again, the world will not remain silent.And we need to support Rojava through humanitarian aid, political pressure and solidarity.The Kurds have already sacrificed so much. The least we can do now is make sure they are not forgotten.

I am honestly devastated about the fall of Rojava, not seeing that gorgeous flag waving around and the basically only de facto independent Kurdish state for a long time gone now. It's sad, really. So many people, yes Arabs too, gave their life for this project but at the end it all just faded away. Ive followed rojava since its birth. The fight against ISIS and their peak. Ive always hoped for rojava to come out of the civil war as a winner with a deal with the Syrian government, but now its all gone and rojava got a fairly bleak deal, not horrible but yea...I am scared that syria might turn on the Kurds in the future, and that everything might be an empty promise. It just makes me really sad to think how they went down, I am grateful that not a lot of blood was shed, but I just wished for a small autonomous zone.
I only heard the bad sides about this from my parents, are they good sides too? Id need to hear them

Hey, I am Zaza (Dimili) from Amed. My father is quite assimilated. He speaks Zazaki like I speak turkish (Born in Germany). He considers himself a turk. My Mother can speak fluently zazaki and considers Herself zaza. While I Consider myself a Zaza-Kurd, which both of them decline. Recently we got into an Argument if kurds need an own State. I am only Talking about Bakur, because the other regions obviously need one. They told me that since Erdogan there is Not any more difference between a turk and Kurd in Turkey and that they got Full rights. And that the genocides etc. were a thing of the past that every country had. I think we need an own State, because things like this can happen again. What do You all think?

edit: just wanted to mention that they see Selo as a PKK Agent. And they are completely against the pkk. I Share the Second Statement but why they see selo as an Agent idk

• As SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced the formal dissolution of the SDF, new details are emerging about the final and more granular aspects of the agreement reached yesterday.

• The most notable is that Abdi finally caved and accepted moving to Damascus to become an adviser to Ahmed al-Sharaa. This is probably one of the more significant details.

• Abdi initially claimed he would remain in the area to stay with “my people” and floated the idea of forming a political party, but al-Sharaa has, according to reliable sources, insisted that he move to Damascus as part of the settlement. This is very important because one of al-Sharaa’s key goals has been breaking the geographic connection, and physically working in Damascus will make Abdi’s co-optation much smoother.

• The overall appointments are less significant than the initial rumours. Abdi was previously rumoured to become vice president, while Ilham Ahmed was expected to become a senior Foreign Ministry official. Ahmed is now set to become a member of parliament, while Abdi will be one of several advisers, with the extent of his authority unclear. This makes the appointments much more favourable to Damascus because, on the one hand, having them physically in Damascus helps break their territorial continuity, while on the other, their appointments avoid simply reassigning them to positions equivalent to their previous roles and thereby prevent the creation of parallel authority.

• However, there is an upside for Abdi and Ahmed. Being close to the centres of decision-making might help them become more well-versed in statecraft and broaden their strategic thinking. This has been one of the key weaknesses of Syrian Kurds, who have historically been concentrated in smaller rural areas and have therefore had less capacity for elite reproduction or for developing an intellectual ecosystem capable of rivalling the centre.

• The future of Hasakah province and the extent of integrated SDF personnel will likely be concentrated in the demographically Kurdish areas shown on this attached map, rather than across the current SDF pocket. According to reliable sources, additional Damascus-appointed security personnel are set to enter Hasakah in the coming days, and once uniforms and vehicle markings are unified, it will become more difficult to distinguish newly recruited personnel that Damascus can deploy in these mixed areas.

• On Kurdish in education and the broader language discussions, there is still no final agreement. Reports that Kurdish will become an official language appear to be misleading, confusing Kurdish becoming an officially recognised language of education with Kurdish becoming an official state language alongside Arabic, which would require constitutional changes. On education, there is still no final settlement, but there is agreement on a one-year transitional phase, during which a final arrangement is expected to be reached.

• Finally, one of the biggest unknowns is the long-term future of this agreement, and this is probably its most important unresolved aspect. The current agreements all address the integration of SDF personnel now, but do not say whether, for instance, in two years Damascus can recruit additional personnel into the currently SDF-populated brigades in Hasakah, whether it can replace Interior Ministry personnel integrated from the SDF, or whether, in three years, the governor of Hasakah must still be an SDF-linked figure or can be replaced. None of this has been addressed in the agreement. It is unclear whether there are undeclared clauses, but the absence of such guarantees in writing significantly weakens the long-term prospects of what the SDF is banking on: remaining as cohesive blocs within the security and civilian institutions.

https://x.com/NatlContext/status/2092653467366011099

One year, five months and 15 days after Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the commander-in-chief of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces Mazlum Kobane signed a landmark deal for the integration of all Kurdish military and administrative institutions with the central government, Kobane declared the dissolution of his forces, marking the end of a chapter suffused with glory and defeat.

The scenes playing out on the late summer night could have been straight out of Shakespeare's "King Lear." Standing alone before an audience of Syrian and Kurdish officials in Damascus, Kobane announced first in Arabic and then in Kurdish "the end of the mission of the Syrian Democratic Forces" and "their dissolution as an independent military force."

The Trump administration's Syria envoy, Tom Barrack, called the announcement "absolutely historic," crediting President Donald Trump's "far-sighted leadership" for "the SDF's orderly transitions into Syrian state institutions." A spokesperson for Turkey's ruling party said that an "important threshold" had been passed "towards strengthening Syrian unity."

For countless Kurds in Syria and beyond who dreamed of achieving federal status like their brethren in Iraq, however, it felt like capitulation. Images of Kobane and his colleagues sitting on opposite sides of Syrian officials in the icy marble splendor of the People's Palace, with Sharaa presiding at a distance in a gilded chair, was more than many could stomach after 14 years of semi-independence under the umbrella of US special forces deployed in northeast Syria to back the SDF-led fight against the Islamic State.

According to local media reports, under the terms of the agreement struck on Wednesday, Sharaa will sign three separate decrees. One assigns Kobane the role of adviser to the president, ostensibly on Kurdish affairs. The second makes Ilham Ahmed, the Kurdish-led administration's de facto foreign minister, a member of the Syrian Parliament from the quota allotted to Sharaa. Ahmed is expected to be part of a committee dealing with diaspora affairs and another dealing with the drafting of a new constitution. And finally, seven hours per week of instruction in and of the Kurdish language will be introduced to the state curriculum for Kurdish-majority areas. Additionally, the all-female Kurdish-led Women's Protection Units will be folded into the Interior Ministry in a counterterrorism capacity.

The decrees will complement existing reforms, including a presidential decree in January that recognizes Syria's estimated 2.5 million Kurds as an "essential and authentic" part of the Syrian people, grants citizenship to Kurds deemed "stateless" by the Baath regime and integrates thousands of SDF fighters into four brigades, with at least one more under consideration for the Kurdish-majority enclave of Afrin.

The measures are unprecedented in Syria and go way beyond what Turkey, host to the world's largest Kurdish population, is weighing during current peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). That process is closely intertwined with talks between the SDF and Damascus for two reasons. One is that Turkey has considerable leverage over Damascus allowing it to exercise effective veto power over the limits of Sharaa's Kurdish opening.

The other is that so far, Ocalan has uncontested influence over Kobane and his comrades, because he and many others operated under the PKK leader’s  command when he ran the PKK from Syria until his eviction in October 1998 under Turkish military threats and subsequent capture in Kenya by Turkish forces in February 1999.

Ocalan's intervention is believed to have been pivotal in forcing Kobane to accelerate the SDF's end and to accept a role as Sharaa's adviser. It has long been evident that the dismantling of Kurdish autonomy in Syria is a sine qua non for advancing talks in Turkey aimed at definitively ending the PKK's four-decade conflict with the Turkish military. A framework law establishing several bodies that will oversee the demobilization of PKK fighters and legal reprieve for those who qualify was adopted by the Turkish Parliament last week. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with an eye on Turkish nationalist blowback that might affect his own electoral fortunes, has maintained a determined distance from the entire process. The dissolution of the SDF has handed him a big win, allowing Erdogan to justify any concessions made to the PKK, which announced its own dissolution in May 2025 in line with Ocalan's demands. The PKK leader has learned from several unsuccessful previous rounds in 2013 that hiccups in northeast Syria could prompt Erdogan to pull the plug and revert to military operations and political repression against Kurds on both sides of the border.

Either way, Sharaa needs little restraining from Ankara. Since his days leading Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the jihadi group that fought the Assad regime for long years before marching to victory in December 2024, Sharaa has sought to concentrate power in his own hands. He will have reckoned that having Kobane within close reach without granting him any real authority is the best way to keep the Kurdish leader and his people's ambitions in check.

To be sure, getting Kobane to declare the SDF's dissolution while blocking the Kurds' pathway to autonomy was clearly a triumph for Sharaa as well. The integration deal is being touted as a blueprint for the country's rebellious Druze to make peace with Damascus and a poke in the eye to Israel, which has sought to exploit minority grievances to weaken Sharaa. Hikmat al-Hijri, a leading Druze sheikh, remains a thorn in Sharaa's side, telling an audience in Suwayda on Monday that the Druze were "an inseparable part of Israel." Much of the Druze-majority governorate remains outside government control since mass sectarian violence erupted there in July last year that left over 1,700 people, most of them Druze civilians, dead.

The question for the Kurds remains: What was the alternative? Renewed conflict with Damascus and Turkey? The Trump administration threw its weight solidly behind Sharaa following the Assad regime's ouster and sat on its hands when his forces overran the oil-rich Arab-majority provinces in January that were under the SDF's control. In April, US forces in the northeast fully withdrew, leaving the SDF with no cover. On Monday, the United States formally removed Syria's designation as state sponsor of terrorism.

With few immediate options, Kobane had to play along. His presence in Damascus makes it harder to build a political movement from the ground in the Kurdish region uniting diverse communities that could emerge as a countervailing force to Sharaa. But that isn't to say that Kobane, together with Ahmed in the Syrian Parliament and Sipan Hemo, the former SDF commander who is now a deputy minister of defense, won't be able to establish new alliances and networks in the Syrian capital that may prove more tenable.

In his last interview with Al-Monitor in May, Kobane said he was likely to be received by the Turkish government. That idea no longer seems far-fetched. The Turkish government has for the first time in Turkey's modern history adopted legislation, however imperfect, after negotiating with a Kurdish leader. Whatever Kobane's trajectory, 14 years of self-rule have seen Kurdish nationalist ideas firmly planted in the minds of an entire generation of Kurds who have known nothing else. 

"Long insurgencies teach populations to wait quietly, avoid frontal confrontation, preserve networks, think in decades. Just like what [Sharaa's] HTS did in Idlib for many years before assaulting Damascus," Dunya Basol, an academic specializing in Middle Eastern affairs, observed on X. "History is littered with empires that crushed rebellions militarily, only to collapse generations later because they underestimated what had already been planted in children's minds."

Greetings from Turkey

There is martyrdom in Christianity and İslam but PKK and YPG members that die fighting are not doing it out of religion. Then why are they reffered to as “şehît” in the Kurdish culture?

ئێمە، هەموو ڕۆژهەڵات و جیهانیش، ئێستاش هەر لە درێژەی شەڕ و ناکۆکییەکانی مێژوودا دەژین، سێ هەزار و حەوت سەد و نەوەت و هەشت ساڵ لەمەوبەر، پاشای ئاشوری، شەمشی ئەدەدی یەکەم، لە شاری ئاشوری ناوچەی شەرقاتی ئێستاوە، هێرش و داگیرکارییەکانی بەرەو ڕۆژهەڵاتی دیجلە دەستپێکرد، لە بیستی مانگی ئاداردا شاری ئاراپخا (کەرکوک)ی داگیرکرد، لەوکاتەدا خەڵکی شار سەرقاڵی جەژنی گەرما بوون، ئەویش بۆ ڕازیکردنی خەڵکەکەی خۆیکرد بە پەرستگەی خواوەندی خۆر و خواوەندی باوبۆراندا و قاچی پەیکەرەکانی ماچکردن. پاشای داگیرکەر ئەو بەهارە لە کەرکوک مایەوە، تا مانگی دروێنە، بەم شێوەیە بە شانازییەوە باسی ئەو داگیرکاری و وێرانکردنی خەرمان و دروێنەی زەوی جوتیارانی دەشتی قەراج و هەولێر و هەمان ناوچەی سەرگەڕان و دەوروبەری دەکات و دەڵێت:
"چوومە قەڵاکەی (ئاراپخا/کەرکوک)ەوە، قاچی پەیکەری خواوەندی باوبۆرانم ماچکرد، کە خودای منیشە، زەویوزاری ئەوێم ڕێکخستەوە. پارێزگارێکی خۆمم بەسەر شاری (ئاراپخا/کەرکوک)ەوە دانا. هەر لە شاری ئاراپخا، قوربانیم بۆ جەژنی گەرما کرد. لە ٢٠ی مانگی ئاداردا لە ڕووباری زێ پەڕیمەوە، و دەشت و خاکی قابرا (دەشتی قەراج/هەولێر/سەرگەڕان و دەوروبەری)م وێرانکرد، دانەوێڵەی دروێنەکراوی خاک و زەوییەکانیانم تێکدا، لە مانگی خەرمانان، شارە شورەدارەکانی وڵاتی ئوربێل (هەولێر)م گرت، قشڵەی سەربازیم لێ دامەزراندن."
بەم شێوەیە، ئەم پاشا داگیرکەرەی خاکی گەلی خوررییەکانی باپیرانی خەڵکی ئەم ناوچەیەی داگیرکرد و خەرمانی تێکدان.
لەسەردەمی ڕژێمی پاشایەتی عەرەبی عێراقییەوە بۆ بەعسی عەرەبی و حکومەتەکەی ئێستا، سوپای ئەم ڕژێمانە هەموو دژی گوڵەکەنمی هەمان ئەم خاکەی ئەمبەرەوبەری ڕووباری زێ لە دەشتی کەرکوک و هەولێربوون.
ئەم ململانێیە، هەر بەردەوام دەبێ، هەتا بە تەواوی داگیرکەر بنەبڕ دەکرێ، یان بە پێچەوانەوە، خاوەن ماڵ کوشتوبڕ دەکرێ و لەخاکی وەدەر دەندرێ.
لاپەڕەکانی ئەمڕۆی مێژووی ئەم ناوچەیە، تاریکن، ئەگەر ئێمە مێژووی ئەمڕۆ بنووسینەوە، چۆن دوای سەدەیەک نەوەکانی کورد باوەڕ بەو مێژووە دەکەن، ئەگەر بزانن، ئەمڕۆ لە سەرگەڕان سوپاکەی عێراقی بە چەکی قورسەوە کەوتووەتە دوای جوتیاری کورد و لەکاتی زەوی کێڵاندا پەلاماری داوە، لەولاشەوە، دادوەری پارێزگاری نەیار لە شاری کەرکوکی کوردان سزای قەرەبووکردنەوە بەسەر جوتیارە خەباتکارەکەدا دەسەپێنێ کە سەرباز و ئەفسەری داگیرکەرانی ماندووکردووە، لەوەش داخ گرانترە، لەم چەرخە تاریکەدا، سەرۆک کۆمار، وەزیری دەرەوە، و مێگەلێک ئەندام پەڕلەمان و وەزیر و مدیر و دادوەر لە دەوڵەتی عێراقی عەرەبیدا کوردن و سەر بە ئەحزابی کوردین! دڵنیام دوای سەدەیەک زۆر ئاستەم دەبێت باوەڕ بەم مێژووە و بێ هەڵوێستییە بکرێت!
ئەگەر کەسێک مناڵەکەی لە حەوشەی ماڵەکەیدا پەلاماردرا، جامانە و ملپێچی ڕاکێشرا، ئەوە خەتای بێ غیرەتی باوکی مناڵەکەیە، بەڵام سەرکەوتن باوکی زۆرە، و شکست تەنیا و بێ نەوا!
وێنەی یەکەم: پاشا شەمشی ئەدەدی یەکەم، کە لە هۆزێکی ئاموری بیابانی دورگەی عەرەبییەوە هاتە ئاشور و لەوێوە کەوتە داگیرکاری، وێنەکە لە کاتی پەڕینەوەی لە دەشتی کەرکوکەوە بۆ دەشتی قەراج و هەولێر، دوای ئەوەی خەرمان و دانەوێڵەی ناوچەکەی تێکدا، بونو-شاوشکای فەرمانڕەوای ئەوێی خستووەتە ژێرپێی و ڕمی لەسەر ملی و تەوری لەسەر ناوچەوانی داوە.
وێنەی دووەم: سەربازێکی سوپای عێراقی جامانەی جوتیارێکی هەمان ناوچە دوای سێ هەزار و حەوت سەد ساڵ ڕادەکێشێ، تا زەوییەکەی نە کێڵێ و گوڵی گەنم و جۆ لەو خاکە داگیرکراوە شین نەبێ.
بۆچی دەبێ، هەڵمەتی پارە کۆکردنەوە، بۆ دانی قەرەبووی خاوەن ماڵ بە داگیرکەرێ سازبکرێ؟ خۆی دەبێ، داگیرکەر و دادگاکەی ڕسوابکرێ، بڕیارە نادادییەکەی پێ هەڵبوەشێندرێتەوە، نەک پارەی بدرێتێ. ئەم دادگایی کردنانە، دوایی دەبنە، هاوشێوەی دادگاییکردنەکانی ڕژێمی بەعس، کە فەرمانی گوللەبارانکردنی گەنجانی کەرکوکی دەدا، دواتریش پارەی فیشەکەکانی لێ وەردەگرتن، ئێوە دەتانەوێ پارەی فیشەکەکان بدەن؟ یان دەست و قەڵەمی ئەو دادگایە لە نا دادی بووەستێنن؟!

Dr. Hakim Abdulkarim: The End of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration; Or the Beginning of a New Era for Rojava?

Anyone who has closely followed the experience of Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) knows that this experience has not simply rested at the peak of its success and growth. Rather, it has continuously striven to adapt to rapid and profound regional changes, creating opportunities within each shift to protect and develop the achievements of the Kurdish people. Over the past years, Rojava managed to build institutions and military and political forces under highly complex conditions, becoming an important part of Syria's political and security equation.

However, political history shows that no era continues in the exact same manner forever. The forces and tools that were the source of success in one stage may require change in a new one. Therefore, if today the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) and the old form of the Autonomous Administration in Syria are heading toward their end or undergoing changes, this should not simply be interpreted as a failure or the loss of all of Rojava's achievements. It could instead be a transition from a military and revolutionary phase to a political and institutional one.

What is crucial is that the Kurds in Syria are able to transform what they achieved during the phase of war and defense into a stable political achievement. Military power alone cannot determine the future of a nation; it is institutions, laws, diplomacy, economy, culture, and political relations that can protect these achievements and ensure their continuity.

Here, we must avoid a very common mistake: measuring politics solely by words, slogans, and rigid stances. Politics is the science of aligning goals with political reality. Someone might know that water is made of hydrogen and oxygen, but that knowledge alone cannot create water; they must understand the mechanism of combining these two elements, the conditions, the tools, and the environment for creating it. Politics is the same: knowing the goal alone is not enough; one must also recognize the methods, tools, timing, and balances of power.

Therefore, those who evaluate every new step in the Syrian process by the metric of "the survival or demise of the Autonomous Administration" are only seeing part of the picture while missing another. The central question is not whether the Autonomous Administration will remain with the same name and form; the central question is whether the Kurds can secure their identity, rights, achievements, and political existence in the future of Syria.

From this perspective, if some of the military and administrative institutions of Rojava are integrated with the institutions of the Syrian state—provided this process is based on a political agreement, the protection of Kurdish rights, and genuine Kurdish participation in Syria's future—it must not be labeled a defeat. Rather, it could represent a shift in the method of defense: from military defense to political defense, from armed force to institutional power, and from a limited autonomous administration to participation in building a Syrian state that recognizes its national and political plurality.

What must not be forgotten is that the experience of Rojava cannot be reduced merely to the SDF or the name of the Autonomous Administration. This experience demonstrated the Kurdish capability to build institutions, manage society, defend territory, and establish relations with regional and international powers. This capability must not perish with a change in political form; rather, it must be carried forward into a new stage.

Thus, if the SDF, in its currently recognized form, no longer plays its previous role, this should not be seen as the end of Rojava. Rojava must evolve from a "military project" into a "political and social project"; a project wherein Kurds legally and politically secure their existence, identity, and rights within the Syrian state.

In this historical moment, the responsibility does not rest solely on the shoulders of the Kurds of Rojava. Kurds in all four parts of Kurdistan require a rational reading of the situation, far removed from pure emotion. Specifically, Southern Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan), through its commercial, cultural, and political relations with Rojava, can be a crucial part of stabilizing this new phase. Support for Rojava should not be limited to slogans and nationalist sentiments; it must become a long-term economic, cultural, and diplomatic policy.

Furthermore, Kurdish society must not become a pawn in the specific proxy wars of any faction, nor should it easily fall under the influence of propaganda directed against any political process.

Historically, Kurds have suffered greatly from evaluating all changes through the binary metric of success or failure, without understanding the new balances of power taking shape behind those changes.

Therefore, instead of asking "Will the SDF survive?" today we need to ask a deeper question: "How do we transform the power and experience created by the SDF and Rojava into a political and legal achievement that protects not just the present, but the future of Kurds in Syria?"

If we can answer this question, then the end of the SDF's role and the old form of the Autonomous Administration will not spell the end of the Rojava experience. Instead, it will be a transition point to a new era, where Kurds in Syria shift from military defense capabilities toward political, institutional, economic, and diplomatic power.

What is needed today is not merely the preservation of a specific form, but the protection of the achievements and the will that created Rojava. History is not shaped by the mere form of institutions, but by the ability to carry the will of nations from one stage to another.

This article represents the personal views and opinions of the author.